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China’s “striving for achievement,” or fenfa youwei (奋发有为) foreign policy strategy challenges 
U.S. regional primacy, emphasizes Chinese leadership in foreign affairs, and vigorously promotes 
economic and strategic initiatives favorable to China.1 According to State Department analyst 
Elizabeth Hague, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promotion patterns will most likely change in 
response to China’s new economic and strategic demands.2 However, there is currently little 
analysis on exactly how PLA promotion patterns are changing.  
 
This thesis fills the gap by statistically analyzing how age, personal connections, education, 
professional experience, and foreign experience are associated with the grade promotions, not rank 
promotions, of 275 high-level PLA officers under Xi Jinping, defined as officers at or above the 
grade of corps leader (正军级).3 This study allows U.S. policymakers to better understand how 
the PLA is directing its hard power resources to support the fenfa youwei strategy, track the types 
of officers who are likely to fill PLA leadership positions in the future, and prepare policy 
responses to address shifting PLA strategic priorities. 
 
This thesis has five major findings. 1) As a high-level officer gets one year older under Xi, his or 
her odds of promotion decrease by a factor of .804. 2) High-level Xi-era officers who have served 
in the Lanzhou or Shenyang Military Regions at or above the corps leader grade sometime in their 
careers are more likely to receive promotions. 3) Each additional level of education (from a middle 
school education to a doctorate) that a high-level Xi-era officer achieves increases his or her odds 
of promotion by a factor of 1.413. 4) High-level Xi-era officers with experience serving in two or 
more PLA services, branches, and danwei (work units), at or above the corps leader grade are 
2.639 times more likely to be promoted than officers without such experience. 5) Combat 
experience during wartime, non-combat experience (including counterterrorism experience, 
disaster relief experience, and experience leading military ceremonies), and international 
experience do not significantly increase the likelihood of high-level PLA promotions under Xi.4 
 
This thesis does not address the change in the PLA’s structure that has occurred since the PLA 
began its massive reorganization in early 2016. New methodologies will be required to 
quantitatively analyze PLA promotion patterns after this reorganization. 
  
                                                     
1 I use simplified Chinese characters throughout this thesis, except when describing or analyzing Taiwanese sources. 
In those instances, I use traditional Chinese characters. 
2 According to Hague, “the PLA in many cases values different skills and promotes for different reasons now 
compared to 30 years ago.” However, it is unclear what these “different skills” are or which of these skills are 
valued the most in promotions. Please consult the Introduction for more information. 
3 An officer’s grade is more important than his or her rank. See the “defining promotions” section in Chapter One 
for more information. Also, in this thesis, “Xi” refers to Chinese President Xi Jinping. 
4 A shortcoming of this analysis is that the CCP Elite Database search process drew heavily from the PLA Army and 
Four General Headquarters Departments. Information was not available for many high-level PLA Navy officers, 
some of whom have served in the PLA’s Naval Escort Task Forces (ETF). Further research is required to analyze 
how experience serving in an Escort Task Force and other important PLAN operations quantitatively impacts 
promotion chances. This primarily impacts the non-combat operations and international experience sections of my 
thesis. Please consult my Concluding Thoughts section for more information. 
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Executive Summary 5 
 
This thesis has five major findings. 1) As a high-level officer gets one year older under Xi, his or 
her odds of promotion decrease by a factor of .804. 2) High-level Xi-era officers who have served 
in the Lanzhou or Shenyang Military Regions at or above the corps leader grade sometime in their 
careers are more likely to receive promotions. 3) Each additional level of education (from a middle 
school education to a doctorate) that a high-level Xi-era officer achieves increases his or her odds 
of promotion by a factor of 1.413. 4) High-level Xi-era officers with experience serving in two or 
more PLA services, branches, and danwei (work units), at or above the corps leader grade are 
2.639 times more likely to be promoted than officers without such experience. 5) Combat 
experience during wartime, non-combat experience (including counterterrorism experience, 
disaster relief experience, and experience leading military ceremonies), and international 
experience do not significantly increase the likelihood of high-level PLA promotions under Xi. 
 
 
Current Studies on PLA Promotion Patterns 
 
 
Military Ranks and Grades in the PLA 
 
There are two main indicators of seniority and authority in the PLA: military rank (军衔) and 
Grade (职务等级 / 职务级别). 
 
 10 Military Ranks. PLA officer ranks (军衔), from lowest to highest, are: 2nd Lieutenant (少
尉), 1st Lieutenant (中尉), Captain (上尉), Major (少校), Lt. Colonel (中校), Colonel (上校
), Senior Colonel (大校), 1-star Major General (少将), 2-star Lieutenant General (中将), and 
3-star General (上将). There are no 4-star generals.6 
  
 15 Grades. Grades are assigned to billets within the PLA and are better indicators of 
seniority and authority. The PLA grades, from lowest to highest, are: Platoon Leader           
(排级), Company Deputy Leader (副连级), Company Leader (正连级), Battalion Deputy 
Leader (副营级), Battalion Leader (正营级), Regiment Deputy Leader (副团级), Regiment 
Leader (正团级), Division Deputy Leader (副师级), Division Leader (正师级), Deputy 
Corps Leader (副军级), Corps Leader (正军级), Military Region Deputy Leader                 
(副大军区级), Military Region Leader (正大军区级), CMC Member (军委委员), and 




                                                     
5 Full citations are provided in the body of this thesis. 
6 The PLA does not have Chinese terms for naval ranks similar to foreign navies, such as commander and admiral. 
In Chinese, they are called a Navy Lieutenant Colonel or Navy General, respectively. However, when publishing 
articles in English or interacting with foreign militaries, the PLA does use Western naval ranks. 




 Importance of Grade Promotions. As discussed in Chapter One, each grade in the PLA, 
except CMC Member and CMC Vice Chairman, has a primary and secondary rank, while 
some ranks, such as Major General, can be assigned to four different grades. Therefore, 
according to Ken Allen, “grades [in the PLA], which are based on an officer’s position, are 
more important than ranks.” For example, the commander and political commissar for a 
particular organization often have different ranks. However, they have the same grade, which 
defines their co-equal authority in the PLA. In this paper, I define “promotions” in terms of 
grade, and not military rank. 
 
 
Five Important Factors that May Increase Promotion Chances 
 
The PLA increasingly emphasizes the importance of professional skills for promotions. Although 
personal and political connections are no longer as important as they were during the Cultural 
Revolution, these factors are still considered when evaluating officers for promotions. Most 
analysts agree that five factors can significantly impact high-level PLA promotion chances: age, 
personal connections, education, professional experience, and international experience. 
 
 Age. Age may be the most important consideration for high-level PLA promotions. Since 
1995, military region leader grades and military region deputy leader grades have 
mandatory retirement ages at 65 and 63, respectively. Please see Chapter One for a full 
chart of officer grades and mandatory retirement ages. The PLA may prefer to promote 
younger officers who can serve for many years before reaching the mandatory retirement 
ages for high-level positions. On average, officers who received promotions to the military 
region leader grade under Hu Jintao were 2.2 years younger than officers who were not 
promoted. I expect younger, high-level officers to have better promotion chances than older 
officers under Xi. 
 
 Personal Connections. Studies demonstrate that officers who have served in the same 
Military Regions as the Commander in Chief may have better promotion chances through 
an “alumni network.” Officers who have served in military regions associated with high-
level PLA corruption cases may be less likely to receive promotions due to perceived 
connections with these corruption cases. Many analysts believe the CMC is more likely to 
trust and promote officers who have served in the Nanjing military region, where Xi 
previously served. Additionally, Xi considers counterterrorism an important policy priority 
and the CMC may be more likely to promote officers who have served in the Xinjiang and 
Tibet military districts.  
 
On the other hand, Xi is more likely to hold unfavorable views towards officers who have 
served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs. These military regions are associated with Guo 
Boxiong and Xu Caihou, two notorious PLA officers indicted on corruption charges. High-
level officers in Lanzhou and Shenyang may have worked with Guo or Xu respectively in 
the past. Therefore, I expect that officers who have served in the Nanjing MR, Xinjiang 
MD, and Tibet MD will have better promotion chances than officers who have served in 
the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs. 
 




 Education. With the PLA’s growing emphasis on professional skills, education may also 
be an important consideration for high-level PLA promotions. According to Allen and 
Corbett, graduate degrees or graduate study may demonstrate superior academic 
capabilities and increase promotion opportunities. Given the PLA’s recent emphasis on 
space-based warfare and cyber capabilities, high-level officers with undergraduate or 
advanced degrees in the hard sciences may also have advantages in promotions.  
 
When analyzing the PLA, it is important to differentiate between “professional military 
education” and academic education. According to Allen, “professional military education 
(PME)” in the PLA is different from the U.S. military and PLA officers do not receive 
PME in the natural and physical sciences.  While the United States PME system provides 
master’s degrees at the Major and Lieutenant Colonel levels, the PLA’s PME mostly 
focuses on military theory and does not lead to graduate or advanced degrees. On the 
other hand, high-level officers can receive advanced degrees in the hard sciences at 
civilian institutions or specialized military institutions.  However, very few of these 
officers serve in command or combat roles, and many officers with advanced degrees 
serve in non-combat positions that involve research and analysis.  
 
Even so, officers in non-combat roles, especially those with strong backgrounds in 
science and technology, can still provide vital contributions to enhance the PLA’s hard 
power capabilities through research and development. 
 
 Professional and International Experience. According to Kou Chien-Wen, officers with 
actual combat experience, experience in major disaster relief or counterterrorism 
operations, and experience organizing prominent military parades and ceremonies may be 
more likely to receive promotions. Since it has been several decades since the PLA engaged 
in actual wartime combat, officers with actual combat experience are likely to be older than 
officers without combat experience. Experience leading non-combat operations, including 
disaster relief and counterterrorism missions, and organizing politically important military 
ceremonies may be more important for promotions in the absence of interstate conflict. 
The PLA may also be emphasizing the importance of international experience, including 
foreign travel, foreign study, meeting with foreign government/military officials, or 







Data Collection Procedures 
 
 High-level Officers. I define “high-level officers” as PLA officers at or above the 
grade (职务级别 / 职务等级) of Corps Leader (正军级). According to Allen and 
Corbett’s charts of PLA ranks and grades, this restricts my analysis to officers at or 
above the rank (军衔) of Major General (少将). 
 




 Data from 2012 to 2015. Since most high-level People’s Liberation Army promotions 
and transfers occurred after the 18th Party Congress leadership transition in November 
2012, I analyzed promotion and transfer patterns from November 2012 to August 
2015. In most cases, data more recent than August 2015 was not available. I collected 
information from PLA officers serving in the PLA’s Four General Departments, the 
PLA Army, the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, PLA Second Artillery Force, and 
People’s Armed Police. 
 
 Chinese Communist Party Elite Database. I compiled most of my data from the CCP 
Elite Database (中共菁英資料庫) at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in 
Taipei, Taiwan. The CCP Elite Database provides information about age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, birth, schools attended, and past government positions held for 
over 8000 Chinese Communist Party cadres. The Database does not contain any 
information about combat experience, non-combat experience (including disaster 
relief, military exercises, and counterterrorism operations), foreign travel, or 
interactions with foreign officers. To fill these gaps, I consulted news articles and 
official government sources from China, Taiwan, the U.S., and other countries. 
 
 
Variables and Coding 
 
 275 Total Entries. I collected data for 275 PLA officers who met the conditions 
specified above. Two officers with missing information were not included in my 
statistical analysis. 
 
 Dependent Variable: GrdChange. GrdChange, or “Grade Change,” tracks whether an 
officer received a grade promotion sometime between November 2012 and August 
2015. Promoted officers received a score of “1,” while officers who were not 
promoted received a score of “0.”  
 
 Coding Individual Officers. I coded each officer according to 11 different 
independent variables. The most important variables correspond to age, personal 
connections, education, professional experience, and foreign experience. 
Additionally, I included three control variables to analyze the impact of officers’ 
initial grades and initial ranks on grade promotions. Please consult chapter 2 for an 
in-depth explanation of my coding procedures. 
 
 Quantitative Methods. I analyzed the impact of each of my independent variables on 
GrdChange using two methods: a descriptive statistical analysis and a logit regression 
analysis. Using descriptive statistics, I was able to directly compare high-level Xi-era 
promotion patterns with Jiang and Hu-era promotion patterns. A logit regression 
analysis allowed me to analyze which independent variables had statistically 










 Age. As a high-level officer gets one year older under Xi, his or her odds of being promoted 
decrease by a factor of .804, holding all other variables constant (p < .01). Additionally, if 
the “age” variable for each of the 273 officers in this dataset is increased by one year, the 
average predicted probability for promotions among all officers would decrease by .024 
(from 29.7% to 27.3%). 
 
 Personal Connections. A logit regression analysis leads to surprising implications about 
how geographic areas of service and personal connections can impact high-level PLA 
promotion chances under Xi. As a high-level Xi-era officer’s “MRegion” score, indicating 
that officer’s duration of service in the Nanjing MR, Xinjiang MD, or Tibet MD, increases 
by one, that officer’s odds of promotion will decrease by a factor of 0.832 (p < .05). If the 
“MRegion” variable for each of the officers in this dataset is increased by one, the average 
predicted probability for promotions among all officers would decrease by .021 (from 
29.7% to 27.6%). While I hypothesized that a higher MRegion score would boost 
promotion chances, the results of my analysis indicate the opposite, that high-level Xi-era 
officers with experience serving in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to be 
promoted (p < .05). 
 
o There are three main possible reasons for these findings. First, the growing 
professionalization of the PLA could simply be reducing the effect of personal, 
political, and geographical connections on promotion chances. In other words, Xi’s 
personal connections in the Nanjing MR are not important enough to influence 
promotion chances. The second possibility is more politically significant: it may be 
that Xi does not have sufficient personal control over the PLA to prevent high-level 
officers who have served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs from receiving 
promotions. Third, Xi may be deliberately reducing the percentage of Nanjing MR 
officers who receive promotions to avoid allegations of nepotism. At the very least, 
favorable geographic Guanxi relationships do not increases the chances of high-
level PLA promotions under Xi. 
 
o Given time constraints and financial limitations, it was impossible to more directly 
analyze Guanxi connections between PLA officers in this thesis. With additional 
resources, it may be possible to specifically define and analyze the degrees of 
personal connections between each of the 275 officers in my dataset. This 
information can be obtained through the CCP Elite Database by evaluating which 
officers have served in the same danwei and went to the same universities, and then 
using this information to map out different “cliques” of officers. It may also be 
possible to travel to China and conduct personal interviews with retired PLA 
officers to fill information gaps. Collecting this additional information about 
personal connections in a future study will allow me to create and define variables 
that can more accurately illustrate the impact of personal connections on high-level 
PLA promotions under Xi. 
 




 Education. Each additional level of education a high-level Xi-era officer has achieved 
increases his or her odds of being promoted by a factor of 1.413, holding all other variables 
constant (p < .05). Furthermore, if the “study” variable for each of the officers in this 
dataset is increased by one level, the average predicted probability for promotions among 
all officers would increase by .035 (from 29.7% to 33.2%). Even though very few officers 
with master’s degrees and doctorates are likely to enter combat or command roles, they can 
use their scientific and technical expertise in non-combat research positions to further 
enhance PLA capabilities.  
 
 Professional Experience. High-level officers with experience serving in different PLA 
danwei, or work units, at or above the corps leader grade are 2.639 times more likely to be 
promoted than officers without such experience, holding all other variables constant (p < 
.05). Additionally, if the “trans” variable for each of the officers in this dataset is increased 
by one, the average predicted probability for promotions among all officers would increase 
by .041 (from 29.7% to 33.8%). However, combat experience, counterterrorism 
experience, disaster relief experience, experience leading military ceremonies, and 
international experience do not significantly increase the likelihood of high-level PLA 
promotions under Xi. 
 
 Foreign Experience. There is no statistically significant correlation between the foreign 
experience (travel abroad, study abroad, or interacting with foreign government/military 






This thesis can help analysts track the types of officers who are likely to fill PLA leadership 
positions in the future. However, my research findings have three additional implications for 
U.S.-China engagement.  
 
 Education and PLA Strategy. An exponential increase in the amount of young PLA 
officers with college degrees, especially in the hard sciences, poses challenges to the 
United States, but also provides opportunities for further engagement. Even if most 
officers with advanced degrees in the hard sciences remain in academia and do not gain 
direct operational unit or theater commands, they can still enhance the PLA’s capabilities, 
using their expertise to spur research and development. Further, their articles and 
publications can influence other PLA officers in command positions to place greater 
emphasis on asymmetric space and cyber capabilities. Increasing academic education in 
the PLA, especially in the natural and physical sciences, will facilitate Chinese 
cyberespionage, cybertheft, and asymmetric space-based operations against the U.S. and 
other East Asian allies.  
 
However, growing professionalism and education in the PLA also provides unique 
opportunities for the United States. The PLA’s strategic culture is likely to shift in the 
future as more PLA officers receive undergraduate and advanced degrees. Whereas 




Clausewitz and other Western military strategists valued transparency in the use of force, 
Chinese strategic culture has historically focused on a Confucian aversion to violence, 
emphasizing deception and strategic ambiguity. Chinese strategic culture is slowly 
changing due to PLA modernization after the first Gulf War and a new group of officers 
is thinking differently. As younger, more educated PLA officers receive promotions and 
the less educated old guard is slowly replaced, the PLA may slowly begin to become 
more transparent and adopt new operational cultures.  
 
Increasing PLA education may provide unique opportunities for the U.S. to improve 
military relations and explain to the PLA how transparency can promote stability by 
helping both sides clarify intentions. Additionally, the U.S. will have more opportunities 
to promote educational exchange programs with Chinese officers and, where possible, 
strengthen personal relationships between officers on both sides. 
 
 Transfer Experience. Approximately 90% of promoted MR deputy leader-grade officers 
under Xi had experience serving in two or more PLA danwei, including the PLA’s seven 
MRs, four General Departments, and different PLA services and branches at or above the 
corps leader grade. Based on my logit regression analysis, high-level officers with 
transfer experience are almost three times more likely to receive promotions than officers 
without transfer experience. The CMC likely considers it vital for promoted officers to 
gain diverse experience in multiple MRs, services, and branches. Wang Shuai-Han also 
emphasizes that extensive transfer experience can help high-level officers strengthen their 
personal networks and gain access to more professional contacts.  
 
U.S. government analysts should keep track of high-level officers with extensive transfer 
experience, as these officers are significantly more likely to receive grade promotions. 
Additionally, it is important to note that serving in multiple MRs and work units provide 
high-level officers with versatile skillsets. This includes extensive counterterrorism 
experience in Xinjiang/Tibet and exposure to Hong Kong and Taiwan issues in 
Guangzhou and Nanjing. The United States needs to be prepared for a new generation of 
PLA officers with highly adaptable skillsets and diverse military experience. 
 
 Xi’s Degree of Personal Control over the PLA. Either Xi does not have enough influence 
in the PLA to reduce the amount of high-level promotions from the Lanzhou and 
Shenyang MRs, or Xi does not want to promote Nanjing MR officers, fearing 
appearances of nepotism. To the extent possible, scholars and government analysts 
should commission additional studies to determine which of these two possibilities is 
more likely. Should the first possibility be true, the United States should be aware that 
discussing critical strategic issues with high-level Chinese civilian leaders may be less 
effective in influencing the PLA’s overall strategic objectives than holding regular 
discussions between high-level U.S. and Chinese active duty military officers. 
Regardless, it is clear that, at least so far, high-level officers serving in the Lanzhou and 
Shenyang MRs are more likely to receive promotions, and U.S. analysts should track 
high-level officers currently serving in these regions to predict future promotions. 
  





Chinese economic development and military strategies have significantly shifted since Xi 
Jinping assumed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) leadership at the 18th Party Congress in 
November 2012. In a 2013 speech to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) foreign affairs 
conference, Xi announced a new Chinese foreign policy strategy called fenfa youwei (奋发有为), 
or “striving for achievement (SFA).”7 The SFA strategy portrays China as a regional leader and 
benefactor, highlighting the importance of strengthening relationships with China’s East Asian 
neighbors. Moreover, the strategy challenges the United States’ regional primacy, emphasizes 
Chinese leadership in foreign affairs, and vigorously promotes economic and strategic initiatives 
favorable to China.8 
Xi’s SFA strategy is a significant shift from Deng Xiaoping’s former foreign policy 
strategy, taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦), or “keeping a low profile and biding one’s time 
(KLP).”9 China employed the KLP foreign policy strategy from the 1990s to the late 2000s.10 
Xi’s recent shift to SFA strongly suggests that China has finished “biding its time,” no longer 
                                                     
7 Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153-184, accessed June 28, 2015, 
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full.pdf+html. According to Xi, “We need to promote diplomatic 
relations with neighbors while [striving for achievement], strive for good neighboring environments for our nation’s 
development, and allow our nation’s development to benefit neighboring countries more, achieving mutual 
development.” See: 习近平在周边外交工作座谈会上发表重要讲话 [Xi Jinping Zai Zhoubian Waijiao Gongzuo 
Zuotanhui Shang Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua] [Xi Jinping is Delivering an Important Speech at the Conference of 
Diplomatic Work Toward Surrounding Countries], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], October 25, 2013, accessed 
November 29, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm. This translation is by the 
author. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. Deng Xiaoping first announced taoguangyanghui in 1990 as part of his “24-Character” foreign policy 
strategy (Deng articulated his strategy using only 24 Chinese characters). According to Deng, “[We must] observe 
calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining 
a low profile, and never claim leadership.” Deng Xiaoping likely implemented this strategy to ensure the survival of 
the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Republic of China amidst the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the 
international backlash following the Tiananmen Square Massacre. See: “Deng Xiaoping’s ’24 Character Strategy,’” 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-
character.htm. 
10 Ibid. 




needs to “maintain a low profile,” and is ready for a proactive leadership role in international 
affairs.11 
In line with “striving for achievement,” China initiated the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2014 as an alternative to international institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB), which 
are largely supervised by western, developed countries.12 Additionally, China’s “One Belt, One 
Road,” or “New Silk Road” initiative seeks to establish “an economic cooperation area that 
stretches from the Western Pacific to the Baltic Sea,” linking three continents by land and sea.13 
Strategically, China is more assertively pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea and 
East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands. 14 China may continue to establish security 
policies like the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) to deter what it considers U.S. 
adventurism in East Asia.15  
Given this more assertive shift in Chinese foreign policy, China must modernize and 
reform its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to meet the SFA strategy’s new hard 
and soft power demands for projecting military force and enhancing military relations. Indeed, 
China is currently reforming the PLA in four main ways.  
                                                     
11 Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement.” 
12 Tania Branigan, “Support for China-led Development Bank Grows Despite U.S. Opposition,” The Guardian, 
March 13, 2015, accessed June 28, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/13/support-china-led-
development-bank-grows-despite-us-opposition-australia-uk-new-zealand-asia; Brenda Goh, “Three Major Nations 
Absent as China Launches World Bank Rival in Asia,” Reuters, November 5, 2014, accessed June 28, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-china-aiib-idUSKCN0ID08U20141105.  
13 Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed,” The Diplomat, May 9, 2014, accessed November 
29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-vision-revealed/.  
14 Richard Javad Heydarian, “China’s New Territorial Assertiveness,” Al Jazeera, July 9 2014, accessed June 28, 
2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/china-territorial-claims-2014786350488424.html; The 
Senkaku Islands are also known as the Diaoyu islands in Mainland China and the Diaoyutai islands in Taiwan. The 
islands are administered by Japan but also claimed by the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. This thesis refers to 
the islands as the “Senkaku Islands” for standardization purposes. 
15 Ankit Panda, “One Year of ADIZ: What’s Next for China?” The Diplomat, November 27, 2014, accessed June 28, 
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/one-year-of-adiz-what-next-for-china/. 




First, China is improving the PLA’s technological capabilities by modernizing ballistic 
and cruise missiles, investing in specialized cyberwarfare units, and enhancing space-based 
reconnaissance and surveillance systems.16 Second, the PLA leadership is increasingly 
employing assertive military strategies like island-building to pursue its territorial claims in the 
South China Sea.17 Third, the PLA is reforming its organizational structure to improve vertical 
command and control capabilities, enhance horizontal coordination capabilities, and promote a 
“modern, nimble force.”18 Finally, the PLA is reforming its personnel promotion and training 
                                                     
16 For example, in May 2015, the PLA decided to modernize its ballistic missile arsenal for the first time in decades, 
upgrading missiles to support multiple nuclear warheads. See: David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China 
Making Some Missiles More Powerful,” New York Times, May 16, 2015, accessed June 28, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/asia/china-making-some-missiles-more-powerful.html?_r=0. The PLA 
is also increasingly investing in specialized cyberwarfare units, such as the notorious “Unit 61398” based in 
Shanghai, and “reaching out to people with necessary cyber skills in the IT sector or academic community to fill 
gaps in state personnel.” Marcel Green argues that President Xi Jinping’s ‘new model of great power relations’ 
policy means that it will not be afraid to challenge the U.S. and the rest of the world in areas it considers a core 
interest, such as cyberspace.” See: Marcel A. Green, “China’s Growing Cyberwar Capabilities,” The Diplomat, 
April 13, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-growing-cyberwar-
capabilities/. Finally, China is enhancing space-based reconnaissance and surveillance systems, as shown in several 
articles from the Chinese National Defense University from 2010 to 2013. See: Guan Qingbo (管清波), 天基侦察与
监视信息支援作战行动于战法 [Tianji Zhencha Yu Jianshi Xinxi Zhiyuan Zuozhan Xingdong Yu Zhanfa] [The 
Support of Space-Based Monitoring and Reconnaissance Information on Combat Operations and Tactics], 国防大学
学报 [Guofang Daxue Xuebao] [Journal of the Chinese National Defense University] No. 6 (2013): 133-138. 
17 Jian Zhang, a lecturer from the Australian National Security College, explains that “in contrast to [China’s] 
relatively conciliatory approach to the South China Sea dispute in the early to mid-2000s, Beijing has appeared to 
become increasingly uncompromising when handling [disputes with neighboring states],” representing a “major and 
arguably long-term strategic shift in Chinese policy regarding the South China Sea.” See: Jian Zhang, “China’s 
Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: A Strategic Shift?” National Security College, Australian National 
University, 2012, accessed November 29, 2015, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief-4.pdf, 19. 
Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reports that China has “dramatically expanded its construction of artificial islands in 
the South China Sea” in 2015 alone. The amount of islands built in the Spratlys increased fourfold between January 
2015 and May 2015. See: Gordon Lubold and Adam Entous, “U.S. Says Beijing is Building Up South China Sea 
Islands,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-
beijing-building-up-south-china-sea-islands-1431109387. 
18 For example, Xi Jinping created the Leading Small Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and the 
Military (中央軍委深化國防和軍隊改革領導小組) in 2014, specifically to address PLA organizational reforms. 
See: 习近平担任中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组组长 [Xi Jinping Danren Zhongyang Junwei Shenhua 
Guofang He Jundui Gaige Lingdao Xiaozu Zuzhang] [Xi Jinping Assumes Leadership of the Central Military 
Commission’s Leading Small Group for Deeping Reform of National Defense and the Military], Renminwang 
[People.com.cn], March 16, 2014, accessed November 29, 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0316/c70731-
24646060.html. In November 2015, the PLA announced that it would reform its existing military region system. A 
source close to the PLA interviewed by the South China Morning Post stated, “It’s a long-anticipated overhaul for 
grass-roots soldiers because it’s a practical push to turn the PLA into a real modern army of international standard.” 
Another source claimed that “a sweeping overhaul of the PLA would phase out its Soviet-style command structures 
in favor of a U.S. style model.” See: Minnie Chan, “China Hits the Launch Button for Massive PLA Shake-Up to 




requirements to create a professional military that “obeys the Party’s commands, is capable of 
winning wars, and has a good work style.”19  
While several studies in the current literature have analyzed the technological, strategic, 
and organizational aspects of Chinese military reforms under Xi, very few studies have explored 
the fourth aspect in detail – how PLA promotion patterns are changing to support shifting 
strategic priorities. Although State Department analyst Elizabeth Hague argues that high-level 
military promotion patterns will most likely change to support changing military strategies and 
foreign policy priorities, exactly how these promotion patterns are changing in the Xi era is 
unknown.20 
My thesis is primarily motivated by the following question – which variables are most 
responsible for increasing the likelihood of high-level PLA promotions under Xi, and to what 
extent? Many academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies have conducted 
research on the PLA, but no quantitative study has analyzed how specific variables can improve 
the likelihood of PLA promotions, especially since China announced its fenfa youwei strategy.  
                                                     
Create a Modern, Nimble Force,” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1883071/china-hits-launch-button-massive-pla-shake.  
19 习近平：努力建设一支听党指挥能打胜仗作风优良的人民军队 [Xi Jinping: Nuli Jianshe Yizhi Tingdang 
Zhihui Neng Dashengzhang Zuofeng Youliang de Renmin Jundui] [Xi Jinping: Strive to Establish a Military that 
Obeys the Party’s Commands, Is Capable of Winning Wars, and has a Good Work Style], Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Xinwenwang [Chinese Communist Party News Network], December 3, 2013, accessed November 29, 2015, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0312/c64094-20755159.html. For example, according to Nan Li, the PLA’s goal by 
2020 is “for all regiment and higher-level commanding officers to have a 4-year college degree and to possess 
diverse service credentials and international experience, and for the majority of them to hold a master’s degree.” 
Nan Li also reports that “new subjects such as joint operations; information operations; operational simulation; 
services and arms operations; strategic logistics; opinion, psychological, and legal warfare; and new science and 
technologies have been integrated into the Chinese National Defense University curriculum.” See: Nan Li, 
“Educating New-Type Military Talent: The PLA’s Command Colleges,” in The People in the PLA, ed. Roy 
Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 291-316. 
20 According to Hague, “the PLA in many cases values different skills and promotes for different reasons now 
compared to 30 years ago.” However, it is unclear what these “different skills” are or which of these skills are 
valued the most in promotions. See: Elizabeth Hague, “PLA Career Progressions and Policies,” in The People in the 
PLA, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 233-274. 
Elizabeth Hague is a Senior Foreign Affairs Research Analyst at the Department of State. 




This analysis can clarify which factors Xi or the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
considers most important when promoting high-level PLA officers. This thesis can also draw 
inferences about which specific Chinese military responsibilities may be most important within 
the “striving for achievement” model based on which promotion criteria is favored the most. 
Some analysts argue that, as the Chairman of the CMC and General Secretary of the Communist 
Party, Xi has significant personal authority over high-level PLA promotions, although this has 
been disputed.21 A quantitative analysis of high-level PLA promotion patterns can shed light into 
Xi’s personal decision making paradigms. Even if Xi does not have absolute personal authority 
over high-level PLA promotions, an analysis can enhance understanding about the CMC’s 
decision making patterns as a whole, which will still be valuable to academics and policymakers. 
Most studies about PLA promotion patterns in the current literature have been qualitative, 
and only analyze case studies of well-known officers receiving promotions. In isolation, 
qualitative approaches cannot adequately shed light on broader trends in PLA officer 
promotions. Wang Shuai-Han’s (Taiwan’s National Chengchi University) 2012 study is one of 
the only quantitative contributions to the current literature on PLA promotion patterns.22 Even 
so, Wang’s study suffers from two deficiencies. First, Wang only uses descriptive statistics to 
analyze promotion patterns, making it difficult to analyze the statistical significance and 
explanatory power of his independent variables. Second, and perhaps most importantly, Wang 
only analyzed promotion patterns throughout the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras; Chinese 
                                                     
21 Please consult Chapter One for more information. 
22 Wang Shuai-Han (王帥涵), “1980 年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官團特徵分析” [1980 Niandai Houqi Zhijin 
Jiefangjun Gaojie Junguantuan Tezheng Fenxi] [Analysis of the Characteristics of High-level People’s Liberation 
Army Officials from the 1980s to the Present], 國立政治大學政治研究所碩士論文 [Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue 
Zhengzhi Yanjiusuo Shuoshi Lunwen] [National Chengchi University Political Science Research Institute Master’s 
Thesis], 2012. 




foreign policy still largely functioned under the KLP strategy during Wang’s period of analysis.23 
Wang therefore could not account for changes in PLA promotion patterns since the advent of the 
“striving for achievement” strategy. 
My thesis aims to fill these gaps in the literature. Using data from the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Elite Database (中共菁英資料庫) at National Chengchi University in 
Taipei, Taiwan, this thesis employs descriptive statistics and a logit regression model to analyze 
how 11 independent variables are associated with the likelihood of grade (职务级别) promotions 
for 275 high-level PLA officers under Xi. I define “high-level officers” as PLA officers at or 
above the grade of corps leader (正军级).24 
This thesis contains four chapters. In Chapter One, I analyze the current state of the 
literature on PLA promotion patterns. From this review, I argue that five main factors likely 
impacted PLA promotion chances in the Jiang and Hu eras: age, personal connections, education, 
professional experience, and foreign experience. These variables will probably continue to 
impact high-level promotion chances during the Xi era, though the extent of this impact must 
still be determined.  
In Chapter Two, I discuss my data collection procedures and operationalize my 
independent and dependent variables. I also outline my hypotheses on how each of my 11 
independent variables may impact promotion chances for high-level PLA officers in the Xi era.  
In Chapter Three, I use descriptive statistics to replicate Wang Shuai-Han’s prior study of 
PLA promotion patterns, this time using my own data from the Xi era. I compare my results to 
Wang’s prior study in the Jiang and Hu eras and explore how Wang’s promotion indicators are 
                                                     
23 Throughout this thesis, “Jiang” refers to Jiang Zemin and “Hu” refers to Hu Jintao. 
24 Chapter One explains the PLA’s system of ranks and grades in detail. 




changing in the Xi era. Then, I create and analyze a logit regression model for my dataset of 275 
high-level Xi-era officers to determine which of my variables can increase the likelihood of 
promotions, and to what extent.  
In Chapter Four, I discuss the results of my analysis. I also draw inferences about which 
specific Chinese military functions may be most important within the fenfa youwei strategy 
based on which promotion criteria the PLA and CCP leadership seem to favor the most. I also 
analyze several findings that can be useful to policymakers and analysts in the U.S. government. 
I conclude by summarizing this study’s contributions to the current literature and suggest several 








Chapter One: Literature Review 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly discuss the PLA’s organizational 
structure and how promotions function within the PLA’s hierarchy. This is particularly important 
because the PLA has two main indicators of seniority and authority: military rank (军衔) and 
grade (职务级别/职务等级). I argue below that defining promotions in terms of “grade” and not 
“military rank” can maximize analytical utility. Second, I explore Xi’s degree of personal control 
over high-level PLA promotions and explore how PLA promotion patterns can shed light into 
Xi’s personal decision making paradigms. Third, I evaluate how PLA promotion indicators have 
changed throughout history; most experts agree that the PLA is increasingly emphasizing the 
importance of professional skills in high-level promotions. Finally, five factors have significantly 
influenced high-level PLA promotion prospects during the Jiang and Hu eras: age, personal 
connections, education, professional experience, and foreign experience. I discuss each of these 
factors in detail throughout this chapter; these factors are still likely to influence promotion 
chances in the Xi era. However, the extent of this impact must still be determined. 
The PLA’s Organizational Structure 
 According to Ken Allen, “the Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for 
leading and providing unified command for China’s Armed Forces, as well as determining 
military strategy and the operational guidelines.”25 There are two “CMCs” in the People’s 
Republic of China: the Party CMC (functioning within the CCP) and the State CMC (functioning 
within the official Chinese government).26 Nevertheless, Xi is the current chairman of both 
                                                     
25 Kenneth Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 2000 – 2012,” in Kevin Pollpeter and 
Kenneth W. Allen, eds., The PLA as Organization v2.0 found at http://www.pla-org.com/downloads/. 
26 “Background Information on the Central Military Commission,” Chinese-Leaders.org, accessed November 29, 
2015, http://chinese-leaders.org/central-military-commission/.  




organizations, and the two organizations have had identical memberships (with very rare 
exceptions).27  
Allen explains that “the Four General [Headquarters] Departments – General Staff 
Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General 
Armament Department – serve as the administrative and functional departments for the CMC 
and the Army/Ground Force headquarters.”28 Additionally, the seven military region (MR) 
Headquarters underneath the Four General Headquarters Departments are “responsible for 
directly leading all subordinate units in their areas of responsibility.”29 The seven military 
regions (MR/七大军区) can be further divided into “military districts (MD/省军区),” usually at 
the Province and Autonomous Region levels, and “military sub-districts (MSD/军分区)” below 
provincial levels.30 For example, the Lanzhou military region “borders on the plains of Central 
Asia” in the Western part of China and contains the Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
military districts. 31 There are usually two or three Group Armies (集团军) garrisoned in each of 
the seven MRs.32 Below is a map of China’s seven military regions. 
                                                     
27 In very rare situations, the Party and State Central Military Commissions have had different memberships. For 
instance, Xi Jinping became the leader of the Party Central Military Commission on November 15, 2012, but he did 
not assume the State Central Military Commission leadership until March 14, 2013. However, Xi Jinping still had 
complete control over both organizations during this transition period. See: “Xi Jinping Named Chairman of CPC 
Central Military Commission,” Xinhua, November 15, 2012, accessed November 29, 2015, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/15/content_27121182.htm.  
28 Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 14; Other PLA services, including the PLA Navy 
(PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery have their own “Headquarters Departments (司令部)” under the 
Four General Departments. 
29 Ibid; Although the PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery are organized under the military region system, these 
services and branches also have their own systems of organization. For example, the PLAN is composed of three 
fleets, the PLAAF is composed of seven Military Region Air Forces, and the Second Artillery is composed of six 
“Bases.” 
30 Ibid. 
31 “Lanzhou Military Region: Lanzhou Military Area Command,” Globalsecurity.org, 2015, accessed November 29, 
2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lanzhou-mr.htm. 
32 Kenneth Allen, in discussion with the author, December 4, 2015; The Chinese term for “Group Army” is jituanjun 
(集团军). The Chinese Government usually translates jituanjun into English as “Combined Corps.” However, the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) translates jituanjun as “Group Army.” To maintain consistency, I employ the 
DoD’s translation of jituanjun throughout this thesis. 





Source: Globalsecurity.org 33 
The following Group Armies are garrisoned within each MR:34 
 
- Shenyang MR: 16th, 39th, and 40th Group Armies 
- Beijing MR: 27th, 38th, and 65th Group Armies 
- Lanzhou MR: 21st and 47th Group Armies 
- Jinan MR: 20th, 26th, and 54th Group Armies 
- Nanjing MR: 1st, 12th, and 31st Group Armies 
- Guangzhou MR: 41st and 42nd Group Armies 
- Chengdu MR: 13th and 14th Group Armies 
Defining “Promotions” 
When analyzing PLA promotion patterns, “promotions” must first be defined in a way 
that maximizes analytical utility. There are two main indicators of seniority and authority in the 
                                                     
33 “Military Regions,” Globalsecurity.org, 2015, accessed November 29, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/mr-map.htm.  
34 Fu Peng, “China Declassifies Designations of PLA Corps,” Xinhua, April 16, 2013, accessed March 23, 2016, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132313248.htm.  




PLA: military rank (军衔) and grade (职务等级/职务级别).35 According to Ken Allen and John 
Corbett, “grades [in the PLA], which are based on an officer’s position, are more important than 
ranks.” 36 One grade can include officers from multiple military ranks. Below are two charts 

















                                                     
35 The PLA has several terms that are translated as “grades:” 
 Deng (等) is translated as grade 
 Ji (级) is translated as level or grade 
 Dengji (等级) is translated as grade 
 Jibie (级别) is translated as grade 
 Zhiwu dengji (职务等级) together is translated as grade, but PLA books usually translate zhiwu (职务) as 
post as compared to gangwei (岗位) which refers to a billet. 
 Junxian dengji (军衔等级) refers to the relationship between ranks and grades 
Much of the existing literature on PLA promotion patterns in English and Chinese uses zhiwu dengji or zhiwu jibie to 
refer to grades. See: “System of Cadre Grades,” in China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition), December 2006, 
Military Cadre Work (军队干部工作) Volume 39, 48-50. 
36 Kenneth W. Allen and John F. Corbett, Jr., “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” in Civil Military Change in 
China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel (Carlisle: 
U.S. Army War College, 2004), 257-261. 
37 Allen and Corbett, “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” 262. 




















Source: PLA as Organization 2.0 38 
Note regarding the charts above: The People’s Liberation Army does not use the rank of “Brigadier General.” 
Instead, Majors in the PLA are promoted to the rank of Senior Colonel (SCOL). According to Ken Allen and other 
experts, Senior Colonels have similar responsibilities as Colonels, just in an expanded capacity, and should not be 
directly compared to Brigadier Generals in western militaries. The PLA does not have Chinese terms for naval ranks 
similar to foreign navies, such as commander and admiral. In Chinese, they are called a Navy Lieutenant Colonel or 
Navy General, respectively. However, when publishing articles in English or interacting with foreign militaries, the 
PLA does use Western naval ranks. 
 
Additionally, the CMC Chairman is not assigned a grade. PLA grades are not assigned numbers, such as O-1 to O-
10, like in the U.S. military. However, PLA special technical officers and civilian cadre are assigned numbered 
grades that equate to the grade levels above. For more information on special technical officers, please see: Kenneth 
Allen and Morgan Clemens, “The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel,” U.S. Naval War 
College, August 2014, accessed March 26, 2016, https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-
Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMS-12.aspx, 4. 
  
For example, officers serving at the corps leader grade (正军级) are predominantly Major 
Generals (少将), but can also be Lieutenant Generals (中将).39 Officers serving at the Corps 
                                                     
38 Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 22. 
39 Allen and Corbett, “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” 262. 




Deputy Leader grade (副军级) are also predominantly Major Generals.40 Based on these 
observations, Allen and Corbett argue that “a grade, rather than the rank, defines the person’s 
authority.” 41 Indeed, corps leader-grade officers have higher authority than corps deputy leader-
grade officers, even though both grades predominantly employ Major Generals.42 This thesis 
therefore defines “promotions” in terms of grade, and not military rank.43 Ken Allen argues that 
“the grade structure is assigned not only to individuals and billets, but also to every organization 
and vessel, defining the PLA’s command and control (vertical) and coordination (horizontal) 
structure.”44  
Xi Jinping as an “Individual Authority Leader” 
 Some experts believe that, as the CMC Chairman and General Secretary of the CCP, Xi 
has significant personal authority to determine which high-level officers receive grade 
promotions and which do not. Others believe that Xi only has direct control over PLA 
promotions at the very highest grades, like military region leader and CMC members. Xi Jinping 
may approve promotions at lower grades as a formality, but usually does not put names up for 
promotions. 
According to Nan Li, “the Commander in Chief (e.g., CMC Chairman) has authority over 
PLA promotions, particularly if [he] is successful in consolidating his leading position in the 
Party and government and within the PLA.”45 Given Xi’s comprehensive consolidation of power 
                                                     
40 Ibid. 
41 Allen and Corbett, “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” 257-261. 
42 As another example, the commander and political commissar for a particular organization often have different 
ranks. However, they have the same grade, which defines their co-equal authority in the PLA. In this paper, I define 
“promotions” in terms of grade, and not military rank. 
43 Please see above for a comprehensive chart of grades and their corresponding military ranks. 
44 Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 16.  
45 Nan Li, “Educating New-Type Military Talent: The PLA’s Command Colleges,” in The People in the PLA, ed. 
Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 308. 




in the CCP, Xi likely has significant personal authority to decide which high-level PLA officers 
should be promoted.  
Kou Chien-Wen agrees with Nan Li that Xi has significant personal authority in the 
Chinese Politburo. Kou uses a comprehensive model (see chart below) to analyze the origins of 
inner party power and legitimacy in the PRC and the former Soviet Union.46 In the PRC and 
Soviet Union, leaders’ beliefs are more likely to affect domestic and foreign policy when they 
have considerable power and autonomy to promulgate policy decisions within the political 
system. Leaders with high operational autonomy can more easily subdue or defeat influence 
from actors with competing views and more directly incorporate beliefs into policy. 
According to Kou, there are two types of leadership in Communist countries, individual 
authority leadership (個人權威型) and position authority leadership (職務權力型).47 Legitimacy 
for individual authority leaders comes mainly from historical feats (歷史功勳) and “Guanxi” 
networks (關係網絡).48 On the other hand, legitimacy from position authority leaders is mostly 
derived from the formal powers of specified leadership positions.49  
                                                     
46 Kou Chien-Wen (寇健文), 制度規範的堆積與耗散：中共與蘇共高層政治演變的軌跡、動力與影響 [Zhidu 
Guifan de Duiji yu Haosan: Zhonggong yu Sugong Gaoceng Zhengzhi Yanbian de Guiji Dongli yu Yingxiang] [The 
Accumulation and Dissipation of Institutional Norms: The Tracks, Power, and Influence of High-Level Political 
Change in the Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Communist Party], Academia Sinica (Taiwan), accessed March 
23, 2016, http://www.ipsas.sinica.edu.tw/image/ipsas/1/166.pdf, 9. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid; Guanxi (关系) is a specialized term in Mandarin Chinese that has no direct English translation. Guanxi is 
usually “a network of mutually beneficial relationships that can be used for personal or business purposes.” See: 
Anthony Goh and Matthew Sullivan, “The Most Misunderstood Business Concept in China,” Business Insider, 
February 24, 2011, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-misunderstood-business-
concept-in-china-2011-2. However, according to Forbes, Guanxi is more than just a personal network, and involves 
“strong qualities of dependability, trustworthiness, and respect” between linked individuals. It also takes long 
periods of time to form good Guanxi, and often involves numerous exchanges of favors to demonstrate loyalty. See: 
Christopher Warren-Gash, “Want to Capitalize on China? You Better Have Good Guanxi,” Forbes, March 15, 2012, 
accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/languatica/2012/03/15/want-to-capitalize-on-china-you-
better-have-good-guanxi/. For more information, please consult the Personal Connections section of this chapter. 
49 Ibid. 




Kou uses Mesquita et al.’s theories of political support throughout his model. According 
to Mesquita et al., the “nominal selectorate” is “every person who has at least some legal say in 
choosing their leader.”50 On the other hand, the “essential coalition” is the “small group of 
essential supporters, without whom the leader will be finished.”51 Kou argues that individual 
authority leaders have more power to influence the essential Party coalition when making 
decisions, and position authority leaders are more likely to rely on their party supporters and 












Kou's model does not consider all variables that can influence individual personal 
authority. Charisma, risk aversion, and the attractiveness of personal beliefs are all factors that 
Kou neglects to analyze. Additionally, “historical feats” is vaguely defined. Despite these 
                                                     
50 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “The Dictator’s Handbook,” (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 4. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Kou Chien-Wen, “The Accumulation and Dissipation of Institutional Norms: The Tracks, Power, and Influence of 
High-Level Political Change in the Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Communist Party,” 9. 




shortcomings, Kou’s analysis of leadership autonomy relative to the essential Party coalition is 
solid, and I agree that strong Guanxi networks can significantly increase “individual authority.” 
Based on Kou’s model, Xi can be considered an “individual authority” leader and has a 
high degree of autonomy in influencing Chinese policy decisions. Considering Kou’s more 
clearly defined Guanxi networks variable, the Brookings Institute reports that Xi’s network of 
friends from Shaanxi, also called the Shaanxi Gang, make up 43% of the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC), 32% of the Politburo, and 11% on the CMC.53 This allows Xi’s allies to 
significantly control Chinese policy decisions, especially on the PBSC, the highest organ of 
Communist Party leadership. Analysts believe Xi does have opposition in the CCP, but has so far 
been able to subdue, defeat, or remove those with competing views. According to Mu Chunshan, 
“[Resistance and real opposition] is exactly why the Chinese government has been building up 
Xi’s authority through the media; Xi needs unity within the CCP as well as popular support. A 
Chinese official told me, ‘they [the opposition] are tough, so Xi has to be tougher than them’.”54 
I believe that Kou’s “historical feats” variable most likely refers to the leader’s historical 
contributions to the Communist Party; Kou uses the Chinese phrase gongxun (功勳), which 
literally translates to “merit in service.” Kou used his model to analyze Mao Zedong, Joseph 
Stalin, and Deng Xiaoping, and the “historical feats” variable is more relevant to these leaders. 
Kou also argues that other leaders, including Jiang Zemin, had lower historical feats and less 
personal authority. 
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 The “historical feats” variable is insufficient for evaluating a leader’s personal authority 
and decision making autonomy. When I analyze Xi Jinping, a fifth-generation Chinese leader, I 
want to expand Kou’s “historical feats” variable and call it “Party legitimacy.” This way, I can 
consider a larger definition that not only includes historical contributions, but also takes a 
leader’s family connections and general CCP reputation into account. 
Xi’s upbringing and life experiences instilled him with a fierce sense of ambition and 
unwavering loyalty toward the CCP. According to the Australia Financial Review and the 
Brookings Institute, Xi joined the CCP even though his father was imprisoned by the Party 
during the Cultural Revolution, and Xi survived the revolution by showing his complete 
commitment to Communist ideology, becoming “redder than the red.”55 Xi served in high Party 
leadership positions as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province and Shanghai, showed historical 
commitment to Communism, and even joined the very Party that imprisoned his father, 
endowing him with significant Communist Party legitimacy and personal authority. Due to 
extensive Guanxi networks and strong party legitimacy, Xi has high leadership autonomy 
relative to the selectorate, allowing his beliefs to more directly impact Chinese policy, 
specifically in the PLA. If Xi Jinping is able to exercise direct control over high-level PLA 
promotions, analyzing promotion trends can offer valuable insight into Xi’s personal decision 
making paradigms. 
On the other hand, experts in the U.S. government question Xi’s personal authority to 
control the PLA. According to a former analyst from the intelligence community, “the PLA can 
be treated as an imperium in imperio, and no Chinese leader, not even Xi, has had complete 
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control over the PLA or Ministry of State Security (MSS).”56 Additionally, Ken Allen indicates 
that Xi only has personal authority to influence promotions from the highest grades in the PLA, 
including MR leader, CMC member, and CMC Vice Chairman.57 Xi is responsible for approving 
promotions at lower grades, but this is mostly a formality; like his predecessors, Xi rarely puts 
candidates’ names forward for promotions at these lower grades.58 Even if Xi does not have 
personal control over all high-level PLA promotions, a quantitative analysis of PLA promotion 
patterns can still shed insight into the CMC’s collective decision making paradigms for 
promoting officers to support the fenfa youwei strategy’s new demands.  
PLA Promotion Qualifications throughout History 
PLA promotion qualifications have significantly changed over the last 50 years. Kou 
Chien-Wen argues that, since 1949, PLA Officers have transitioned from “dual-role elites 
(people who are members of the government and military simultaneously)” during the Cultural 
Revolution, to “professional soldiers under the leadership of the CCP. ”59 The proportion of PLA 
officers simultaneously serving in CCP leadership positions has also significantly decreased. For 
example, 46.4% of Politburo members in the 12th Party Congress (1982) simultaneously served 
in the PLA, while only 8% of Politburo members in the 18th Party Congress (2012) were 
simultaneously PLA members.60 Thomas Bickford argues that while promotions largely 
depended on “political criteria during the Cultural Revolution,” military reforms in 1988 “more 
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clearly tied promotions to education and professional skills.”61 Kristen Gunness and Fred 
Vellucci explain that, in 2006, the PLA included written examinations as part of the pre-
promotion evaluation process for officers, testing candidates for professional skills in addition to 
“assessing their moral character.”62  
As explained above, the PLA is increasingly emphasizing the importance of professional 
skills for promotions. However, PLA promotion procedures still consider personal and political 
connections; these factors are not as important as they were during the Cultural Revolution, but 
they are still relevant.63 As such, analysts believe that promotion qualifications rely on both 
formal and informal politics; most analysts agree that five factors may have significantly 
influenced high-level PLA promotion prospects during the Jiang and Hu eras: age, personal 
connections, education, professional experience, and foreign experience. 
Age 
Age may be the most important consideration for high-level PLA promotions. Allen and 
Corbett explain that, in 1994, “mandatory [retirement] ages were established for MR leader (正
大军区级) grades and MR deputy leader (副大军区级) grades at 65 and 63, respectively.64 
Therefore, the PLA may prefer to promote younger officers who can serve for many years before 
reaching the mandatory retirement ages for high-level positions. Kou Chien-Wen argues that age 
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is a critical factor and younger officers often have better chances of being promoted.65 Dr. Alice 
Miller of the Hoover Institution also cites age as a key factor for promotions to the CMC.66  
There are different mandatory retirement ages for personnel in combat and non-combat 
specialties. The chart below compares information from Article 14 and Article 46 of the PLA 
Active-Duty Officer Law (中华人民共和国现役军官法) published on December 28, 2000.67 
Article 14 indicates the maximum age for officers serving in military, political, logistics, and 
armament billets in combat units (作战部队).68 Article 46 indicates the ages for officers in non-
combat units.69 The mandatory retirement age applies to both the deputy and leader positions for 
company through corps grades. Within the MR grade, however, the deputy leader and leader 
positions have different mandatory retirement ages. 
Active-Duty Officer Mandatory Retirement Age Comparison70 
 










Platoon grade (排级职务) 30  
Company grade (连级职务)71 35  
Battalion grade (营级职务) 40  
Regiment grade (团级职务) 45 50 (leader) 
Division grade (师级职务) 50 55 (leader and 
deputy leader) 
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Corps grade (军级职务) 55 58 (deputy 
leader) 
60 (leader) 
MR deputy leader grade (副大军区职) 63  
MR leader (正大军区职) 65  
 
As explained above, younger officers may be more likely to receive promotions than 
older officers simply because, as officers age, they naturally reach their mandatory retirement 
ages and are required to leave the PLA. However, prior studies report that younger officers have 
better promotion chances across the board. For example, assuming two, MR deputy leader-grade 
PLA officers have not yet reached their mandatory retirement ages, the younger of these two 
officers is more likely to be promoted to the next grade. Indeed, Wang Shuai-Han demonstrates 
that, on average, officers who received promotions to the MR leader grade during the Jiang era 
were 2.6 years younger than officers who were not promoted. Similarly, officers who received 
promotions to the MR leader grade during the Hu era were 2.2 years younger than officers who 
were not promoted.72 I hypothesize that age has become even more important for high-level PLA 
promotions under Xi. 
Personal Connections 
Personal connections or Guanxi networks are also important considerations for high-level 
PLA promotions.73 Officers with close personal or geographical ties to the CMC Chairman, who 
serves as the Commander in Chief (统帅), and officers from prominent family backgrounds are 
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more likely to receive promotions. Additionally, officers with family backgrounds in Shandong 
Province were historically more likely to receive promotions. 
Kou Chien-Wen argues that officers with close connections to the Commander in Chief, 
or officers in the same “clique” as the Commander in Chief (CMC President) are more likely to 
be promoted.74 Ken Allen agrees, explaining that “besides age, personal relationships, or Guanxi 
[with influential CMC decision makers], add a less predictable but arguably equally important 
layer, especially for ascertaining who the next [CMC] vice chairmen will be.”75  
Additionally, studies demonstrate that officers who have served in the same geographical 
regions as the commander or political commissar often have better chances of being promoted. 
Willy Lam explains that Xi promotes (in terms of grade) many high-level PLA officers who have 
served in the Nanjing MR at some time during their careers.76 According to Lam, “the Nanjing 
MR covers Shanghai, as well as the provinces of Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi. 
President Xi has served in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, [so] he is on friendly terms with 
personnel from this MR.”77 On the other hand, officers who have served in MRs associated with 
high-level PLA corruption cases are less likely to be promoted due to perceived connections with 
these corruption cases. Lam argues that Xi may be suspicious toward senior officers who have 
served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs; CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, 
two of the most prominent PLA officers indicted for corruption, served in the Lanzhou and 
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Shenyang MRs, respectively. 78 Many high-level officers in those regions may still have 
connections with Guo and Xu. 
Kou Chien-Wen also believes that having a strong family background with a history of 
achievements and contributions to the PLA can increase the likelihood of promotion.79 However, 
Bo Zhiyue from the National University of Singapore partly disagrees with Kou. Bo analyzed the 
promotion patterns of “Princelings,” children of veteran Communist Party leaders, in the PLA 
and found that while family connections allowed some Princelings to rapidly advance in the 
PLA, strong family connections can also be a liability. Accusations of nepotism and the negative 
reputations of “Princelings” in the 1980s and 1990s created a “glass ceiling” for promotions, and 
many “Princeling Generals” were not promoted past “deputy” positions in the PLA and the 
Communist Party Central Committee.80 These studies demonstrate that family connections can 
be a plus for lower level promotions, but may be less of a factor for promotions to the highest 
grades. At the highest levels, it seems that personal or geographic connections to the Commander 
in Chief can more significantly influence promotion chances. 
Although several studies in the current literature have analyzed how personal and 
geographic connections can impact high-level PLA promotions under Xi, most of these studies 
have used qualitative research methods and individual case studies to support their arguments. 
By evaluating officer connections to the Nanjing, Lanzhou, and Shenyang MRs, this thesis aims 
to quantitatively determine which forms of personal connections are most responsible for 
increasing Xi-era officer promotion chances, and to what extent. I hypothesize that extensive 
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leadership experience in the Nanjing MR may increase promotion chances under Xi, while 
leadership experience in the Lanzhou or Shenyang MRs may decrease promotion chances. 
James Mulvenon also argues that officers’ provinces of family origin heavily impacted 
high-level PLA promotion chances during the 1990s.81 Mulvenon reports that “nearly one 
quarter of the 1989 and 1994 officer corps was born in Shandong Province.”82 Possible 
explanations for the excess of high-level PLA officers from Shandong Province include 
Shandong’s “long and respected history of producing military leaders,” the favorable physical 
characteristics of Shandong recruits, and Shandong’s history as one of the first provinces to be 
reunified during the “Chinese War of Liberation” in 1945.83 Wang Shuai-Han hypothesizes that 
as post-1945 PLA officers receive promotions and as the PLA becomes more professional, 
young people from all provinces will have more opportunities to join the PLA.84 
Furthermore, Mulvenon compared the proportion of promoted PLA officers who have 
commanded each of China’s group armies in 1989 and 1994.85 Mulvenon’s findings indicate that 
the CCP may be balancing the power of each group army, preventing one or two group armies 
from seizing advantages in promotions.86 Officers who have served in group armies that were 
later disbanded through PLA organizational reforms are likely to lose their personal connections, 
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hurting promotion chances.87 According to Mulvenon, “the loss of one’s factional base has 
nearly always prevented promotion to the top ranks.”88 
For these reasons, I should begin to see more balanced promotion rates among officers 
from different provinces and among officers who have led different group armies. The power of 
the “Shandong Clique” should also begin to wane as the influence of informal politics on high-
level promotions decreases. As the PLA becomes more professional, I expect to see more 
balanced promotion rates among officers from different provinces and officers who have led 
different group armies under Xi. 
Education 
 With the PLA’s growing emphasis on professional skills, education has also become an 
important consideration for high-level PLA promotions. As of 2007, the People’s Liberation 
Army had between 60 and 65 officer academies, depending on how they are counted (as one 
university with two academies or three separate institutions).89 Additionally, Ken Allen explains 
that there are currently 118 National Defense Student Programs, which are partnerships with 
engineering, science, and technology programs at civilian institutions.90 These programs 
demonstrate that education in the hard sciences is becoming more important to the PLA. 
According to Allen and Corbett, military education and proper education credentials, 
including bachelors and master’s degrees, have become formal promotion requirements.91 
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Moreover, Elizabeth Hague argues that “having a clear background in military training increases 
the chance of promotions.”92 Officers attending academic institutions affiliated directly with the 
CCP or PLA can likely receive more specialized training and network with other high-level 
officers who have graduated from these institutions. Nan Li also reports that “new subjects such 
as joint operations; information operations; operational simulation; services and arms operations; 
strategic logistics; opinion, psychological, and legal warfare; and new science and technologies 
have been integrated into the Chinese National Defense University curriculum.”93 Backgrounds 
in the physical and natural sciences may also improve promotion chances. 
When analyzing the PLA, it is important to differentiate between “professional military 
education” and academic education. According to Allen, “professional military education 
(PME)” in the PLA is different from the U.S. military and PLA officers do not receive PME in 
the natural and physical sciences.94 While the United States PME system provides master’s 
degrees at the Major and Lieutenant Colonel levels, the PLA’s PME does not lead to graduate or 
advanced degrees.95 On the other hand, PLA officers can receive advanced degrees in the hard 
sciences at civilian institutions or specialized military institutions.96 However, very few of these 
officers serve in command or combat roles, and many officers with advanced degrees serve in 
non-combat positions that involve teaching, research, and analysis.97 
Even so, officers in non-combat roles, especially those with strong backgrounds in 
science and technology, can still provide vital contributions to enhance the PLA’s hard power 
capabilities through research and development. I hypothesize that graduate degrees or experience 
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studying at the graduate level can demonstrate superior academic capabilities and increase 
opportunities for promotion under Xi. I also expect strong backgrounds in military science, 
physical science, and the natural sciences to increase high-level promotion chances. 
Professional Military Experience 
 Generally, officers with wartime combat experience, experience in major disaster relief 
or counterterrorism operations, and experience organizing prominent military parades and 
ceremonies are more likely to receive promotions. Officers with experience serving in multiple 
PLA work units are also likely to be promoted. 
Kou Chien-Wen argues that officers in charge of military command and administration, 
as well as political commissars, are more likely to be promoted, especially at higher grades.98 
Leading large military ceremonies and parades may lead to promotions, and experience serving 
in multiple work units (danwei) of the PLA (including the Four General Departments, multiple 
MRs, and military services and branches) may be beneficial.99 Finally, leading PLA non-combat 
operations, including disaster relief and counterterrorism missions, and actually participating in 
combat during wartime may significantly boost promotion chances.100 Elizabeth Hague agrees 
with Kou and notes that “rewards are given to officers or work units who make an outstanding 
contribution or a notable achievement in combat or troop building, or makes a significant 
contribution for the country and the people.”101 According to Hague, “extensive media coverage 
and profiles” can also lead to promotions.102 However, Hague believes that “neither PLA culture 
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nor regulations encourage promoting operational and political officers over technical officers,” 
and the PLA currently has a greater need for technical officers.103 Wang Shuai-Han agrees with 
Kou that experience serving in multiple units or departments, especially at high grades, may 
significantly boost high-level promotion chances.104 
 Wang Shuai-Han also evaluated the impact of combat experience during wartime on 
high-level promotions under Jiang and Hu. Wang’s study demonstrates that under Jiang, 15.8% 
of officers with no wartime combat experience were promoted to the MR leader grade. On the 
other hand, 23.2% of officers with any type of wartime combat experience earned promotions to 
the MR leader grade, marking a 7.4% increase.105 Since it has been several decades since the 
PLA engaged in actual wartime combat, officers with actual combat experience are likely to be 
older than officers without combat experience.  
In the Hu era, the number of high-level officers with wartime combat experience declined 
due to age. 14.5% of officers with no actual combat experience were promoted to the MR leader 
grade, and 3 of only 26 officers (11.5%) who had any type of combat experience were 
promoted.106 Wang also argues that officers with experience serving in multiple MRs and 
different PLA General Headquarters departments are more likely to be promoted due to diverse 
experience and a wider network of personal connections.107 
The decreasing number of officers with wartime combat experience makes it more 
difficult to determine the relationship between combat experience and high-level promotions. 
However, many scholars agree that experience leading non-combat operations and organizing 
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politically important military ceremonies can improve promotion chances. I hypothesize that 
non-combat experience has become even more important for high-level officer promotions under 
Xi. 
Foreign Experience 
 Analysts disagree on whether foreign travel and interactions can increase promotion 
chances. Kou Chien-Wen argues that hosting foreign military officers or dignitaries, or traveling 
abroad for official visits to other countries, may also increase the likelihood of promotions.108 
Nan Li explains that the PLA’s goal by 2020 is “for all regiment and higher-grade commanding 
officers to have a 4-year college degree and to possess diverse service credentials and 
international experience, and for the majority of them to hold a master’s degree,” emphasizing 
the importance of international experience.109 Historically, the percentage of PLA officers with 
college degrees has been low, and this new emphasis on education and international experience 
means that PLA professionalization is becoming more important.110  
On the other hand, Allen and Corbett believe that “foreign travel has not been clearly 
established as an indicator of future promotion potential,” and high-level PLA officers are 
“limited by regulation to one trip abroad per year.”111 The PLA has tried to include senior MR, 
Military Region Air Force, and Naval Fleet leaders as members of senior officer delegations 
abroad to grant these officers at least one opportunity to travel abroad.112 According to Ken 
Allen, travel by a certain officer may occasionally indicate that they will move up the grade 
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ladder to become the next service commander or deputy commander.113 For example, Liu 
Shunyao accompanied CMC Vice Chairman Chi Haotian to the United States in November 
1996, and was promoted the next month.114  
Despite the lack of consensus in the literature, the PLA has clearly highlighted the 
importance of high-level officers gaining international experience by 2020. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that foreign travel experiences, foreign study experience, and interactions with 
foreign government/military officials can increase high-level promotion chances under Xi. 
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Chapter Two: Research Design 
 This chapter begins with an outline of my data collection procedures. Next, I describe my 
dependent variable and highlight two quantitative tools that I plan to use for data analysis. Then, 
I explain the coding procedures for each of my 11 independent variables. Finally, I propose 
hypotheses on how each of my independent variables may impact promotion chances for high-
level PLA officers in the Xi era. 
Data Collection Procedures 
My thesis analyzes the promotion patterns of high-level PLA officers under Xi. Because 
Xi assumed the Chinese leadership in November 2012, this thesis analyzes promotion patterns 
from November 2012 to August 2015. This period of analysis allows me to fully explore the 
fenfa youwei strategy’s impact on high-level PLA promotions. In most cases, data more recent 
than August 2015 is not available. It must also be noted that in November 2015, the PLA 
announced that it would regroup its existing seven MRs into five new “theater commands:” the 
Eastern (东部), Southern (南部), Western (西部), Northern (北部), and Central (中部) 
commands in protocol order.115 My thesis does not account for the PLA’s newly proposed 
organizational reforms, and doing so will require a different research design. Even so, analyzing 
promotion patterns between November 2012 and August 2015 still provides valuable 
contributions to the current body of literature, allowing analysts to understand how promotion 
patterns have changed between the Jiang, Hu, and Xi eras. 
I define “high-level officers” as PLA officers at or above the grade of corps leader (正军
级). This restricts officers in my dataset to officers at or above the rank of Major General (少将), 
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as corps leader officers must be at least Major Generals.116 I collected data from all PLA officers 
serving within the period of analysis who also satisfy the grade requirements outlined above. 
This includes all officers serving in China’s seven MRs, the PLA’s Four General Departments, 
the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), and 
People’s Armed Police (PAP).  
I compiled most of my data from the CCP Elite Database (中共菁英資料庫) at Taiwan’s 
National Chengchi University (NCCU).117 The CCP Elite Database, organized by Professor Kou 
Chien-Wen of NCCU’s Institute for East Asian Studies (東亞研究所), provides information 
about age, gender, ethnicity, education, birth, schools attended, and past government positions 
held for over 8,000 CCP officers.118 To gather information for all PLA officers in the Database 
who could possibly be serving under Xi Jinping, I searched for officers who were born in 1950, 
or officers at the age of 65 or younger. I then collected relevant data from these search results.  
However, the Database is missing information about education and birth for certain 
officers.119 The Database also does not contain any information about combat experience, non-
combat experience (including disaster relief, military exercises, and counterterrorism operations), 
foreign travel, or interactions with foreign officers. To fill these gaps, I consulted news articles 
and official government sources from China, Taiwan, the United States, and Singapore. 
                                                     
116 See the “defining promotions” section in Chapter One for more information. 
117 Kou Chien-Wen (寇健文), 中共菁英資料庫 [Zhonggong Jingying Ziliaoku] [Chinese Communist Party Elite 
Database], National Chengchi University, Taiwan, accessed March 23, 2016, http://cped.nccu.edu.tw/.  
118 Ibid. 
119 A shortcoming of this analysis is that the CCP Elite Database search process drew heavily from the PLA Army 
and Four General Headquarters Departments. Information was not available for many high-level PLA Navy officers, 
some of whom have served in the PLA’s Naval Escort Task Forces (ETF). Further research is required to analyze 
how experience serving in an Escort Task Force and other important PLAN operations quantitatively impacts 
promotion chances. This primarily impacts the non-combat operations and international experience sections of my 
thesis. Please consult my Concluding Thoughts section for more information. 




Using these research procedures, I successfully compiled data for 275 responsive PLA 
officers who, as of November 2011, were still serving in PLA active duty roles. I used an excel 
spreadsheet to organize my data, which can be accessed at http://bit.ly/1Rjg6wO.    
Dependent Variable: GrdChange 
 My dependent variable, “GrdChange,” or “Grade Change,” is a dichotomous variable that 
can only take the values of “0” or “1.” I assigned GrdChange scores to all 275 officers in my 
dataset. I coded an officer’s GrdChange score as “1” if that officer received a promotion to his or 
her current grade from the grade immediately below it sometime within the period of analysis.120 
I coded an officer’s GrdChange score as “0” if that officer’s grade stayed constant throughout the 
period of analysis, if the officer retired from the PLA sometime during the period of analysis, or 
if the officer moved from the PLA into a Chinese government/CCP position sometime during the 
period of analysis. I created another variable, GrdNotes, to track officers who are no longer 
serving in the PLA. To identify the reasons these officers left the PLA, I coded GrdNotes as “1” 
for retired officers, “2” for officers who moved from the military into the government, and “.” 
for officers who have no special conditions to note. 
 Obtaining each officer’s GrdChange score required extensive research and data 
preparation. As explained above, “the grade structure is assigned not only to individuals and 
billets, but also to every organization and vessel, defining the PLA’s command and control 
(vertical) and coordination (horizontal) structure.”121 In other words, every billet in the PLA is 
associated with a specific grade. Therefore, to track whether a PLA official’s grade changed 
from November 2012 to August 2015, I had to identify that official’s specific military billet in 
November 2012 and in August 2015. I used a four step approach to obtain this information. 
                                                     
120 See Allen and Corbett’s chart of PLA Officer Grades above. 
121 Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 16.  




First, I looked up career information for each of the 275 officers in my dataset. Career 
information for most officers was available in the CCP Elite Database. When information was 
missing in the Database, I used additional internet sources like ChinaVitae to obtain the required 
data.122  
Second, using this information, I recorded officers’ military billets right before Xi took 
power in November 2012 (BilletBefore), right after Xi took power in November 2012 
(BilletAfter), and their most recent billets as of August 2015 (BilletNow). Because multiple 
officers received grade promotions immediately after Xi Jinping took power, it was important to 
collect billet information immediately before and after Xi assumed the Chinese leadership.  
Third, I consulted two charts compiled by Professor Kou Chien-Wen of NCCU to obtain 
comprehensive information about the specific military billets associated with each grade. The 
charts are called “Chart of Billets at or Above the Corps Leader Grade in the PLA's Four General 
Departments (解放軍四大總部正軍級以上職務) and “Chart of Billets at or above the Corps 
Leader Grade in the Work Units of the PLA and PAP (解放軍、武警部隊正大軍區級單位正軍
級以上職務表).”123  
Finally, using these charts, I converted officers’ billets in the BilletBefore, BilletAfter, 
and BilletNow columns on my Excel spreadsheet to numerical scores representing actual grades. 
These new scores are listed under GrdBefore, GrdAfter, and GrdNow. If an officer’s military 
billet was associated with the “corps leader” grade, I assigned a score of “1” to that officer. I 
assigned scores of “2” and “3” to billets at the “MR deputy leader” grade and “MR leader” 
grade, respectively. I assigned a score of “4” to officers serving at the CMC member grade. I 
                                                     
122 “China Vitae Homepage,” China Vitae, 2016, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.chinavitae.com/.  
123 Please see Appendix II for a scan of these charts. 




assigned a score of “5” to officers serving at the CMC Vice Chairman grade. I subtracted 
officers’ GrdBefore scores from their GrdNow scores to obtain a net grade change from 
November 2012 to August 2015.  
If this score was positive, I assigned the officer a GrdChange score of 1, meaning that 
officer obtained a grade promotion. If this score was zero, I assigned a GrdChange score of 0, 
meaning that officer did not obtain a grade promotion. If I could not perform the calculation 
because the officer retired or was transferred to the Chinese government sometime within the 
period of analysis, I assigned a GrdChange score of 0 and also assigned a GrdNotes score in the 
manner described above.  
Quantitative Tools for Analysis 
 I use two quantitative tools to analyze my data: descriptive statistics and a logit 
regression analysis. Both tools provide unique advantages, allowing me to shed light on high-
level, Xi-era PLA promotion patterns from different angles. 
 A prior descriptive study on PLA promotion patterns already exists in the literature. 
Wang Shuai-Han’s 2012 study uses descriptive statistics to analyze PLA promotion patterns 
under Jiang and Hu. By replicating Wang Shuai-Han’s research methods using my data from the 
Xi era, I can directly compare high-level PLA promotion patterns under Xi with high-level 
promotion patterns under Jiang and Hu. 
 However, using descriptive statistics is insufficient for analyzing the statistical 
significance and explanatory power of independent variables. To evaluate which independent 
variables increase the chances of high-level PLA promotions during the Xi era and to what 
extent, I must create and analyze a logit regression model.  




Essentially, a regression model describes how independent variables are associated with a 
dependent variable. A logit regression is a special type of regression model that can handle a 
dichotomous or categorical variable like GrdChange that only has two outcomes. Normal 
regression models assume that errors are normally distributed, which relies on a normally 
distributed dependent variable. However, since dichotomous dependent variables are never 
distributed normally, I need to use a logit regression model to analyze GrdChange. In this thesis, 
I create a logit regression model using STATA, a data analysis and statistical software package 
from STATACorp. 
By using both descriptive statistics and a logit regression model, it is possible to compare 
Xi-era promotion patterns to Jiang and Hu-era promotions while also assessing the impacts of 
each independent variable on high-level promotions under Xi. The rest of this chapter proceeds 
as follows. First, I describe the coding procedures for each of my 11 independent variables. 
Then, I explain how I plan to analyze each variable: descriptive statistics, a logit regression 
model, or both tools. Finally, I propose hypotheses on how each of my independent variables 
may impact promotion chances for high-level PLA officers in the Xi era. 
Independent Variables 
Independent Variable 01: Age 
 Most analysts in the current body of literature believe that age may be a critical factor in 
PLA promotions. However, the extent to which age is likely to boost high-level promotion 
chances is still unclear. In this thesis, I use a logit regression model to explore how age impacts 
high-level promotion chances under Xi and evaluate the extent of this impact. 
 “Age” is a cardinal variable indicating an officer’s current age. I obtained age 
information for all 275 officers in my dataset from the CCP Elite Database at NCCU. The 




Database contained dates of birth for CCP officers. To obtain an official’s age, I rounded his or 
her date of birth to the nearest year and subtracted the result from 2015. When information was 
not available in the database, I used additional sources to compile the required data. Based on the 
current literature on PLA promotion patterns, I propose the following hypotheses on how age 
may impact promotion chances: 
H1: Younger officers are more likely to receive grade promotions under Xi than older officers. 
Independent Variable 02: FOrigin 
“FOrigin,” or Family Origin, is a nominal variable that indicates an officer’s province, 
autonomous region (AR), or directly administered municipality of family origin. Hereafter, these 
three types of locations are lumped together as “provinces” or “provincial.” China has 22 
provinces, five ARs, and four directly administered municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
and Chongqing). The FOrigin variable tests if promotion rates among officers from different 
provinces are becoming more balanced under Xi’s leadership. I collected provincial origin 
information for all 275 officers in my dataset from the CCP Elite Database. The Database has 
two metrics relating to provincial origin: zuji (祖籍) and chushengdi (出生地). Zuji indicates an 
officer’s province of family origin, or the province that the officer’s family roots are based in. On 
the other hand, chushengdi indicates the officer’s province of birth. In many instances, the zuji 
province is the same as the chushengdi province. However, I encountered several cases where 
officers were born in one of the four municipalities, such as Beijing City, but their family roots 
were still based in a different province.  
I decided to use provinces of family origin (zuji), and not provinces of birth (chushengdi), 
in this project for two reasons. First, the province of family origin may be a better indicator of an 
officer’s family history, perceived competence, and geographical ties than the province of birth. 




For example, suppose that one officer was born in Beijing City, but had family ties in Shandong 
Province. In this case, the officer would still be associated with the “Shandong Clique” despite 
his birth in Beijing City, and collecting data for his province of family origin leads to a more 
accurate analysis. Second, zuji information was available for the vast majority of officers in my 
dataset, while chushengdi information was more elusive. Therefore, I decided to use zuji to 
minimize the number of officers with missing data. 
I designed FOrigin as a nominal variable that can take 28 different values: Anhui, Beijing 
City, Chongqing City, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Shaanxi, 
Shandong, Shanghai City, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin City, Yunnan, Zhejiang, and Unknown. I am 
leaving out Xinjiang and Tibet since no officers in my dataset had family origins in these regions 
and Wang Shuai-Han did not evaluate these regions in his descriptive statistical analysis. Since 
FOrigin is not an ordinal variable and I could not rank these 28 variables in an order of relative 
importance, I was only able to use descriptive statistics to analyze this variable and was not able 
to employ a logit regression model. To enable a logit regression analysis, I would have needed to 
design 28 separate dummy variables for each of China’s provinces (and an unknown category) to 
test whether each officer had family origins in said provinces, but this would have resulted in 
very few observations for certain provinces. A logit regression model with 28 dummy variables 
would likely have minimal explanatory power and statistically insignificant results. Therefore, I 
chose to only analyze FOrigin using descriptive statistics. 
Based on the current literature, I propose the following hypothesis regarding how 
provinces of family origin may impact high-level PLA promotion chances: 




H2: Due to increasing PLA professionalism and growing opportunities for young men and 
women to join the PLA, I should see more balanced promotion rates among officers from 
different provinces under Xi. 
Independent Variable 03: Study 
 I created two variables to test the relationship between education experience and high-
level promotion chances: “Study” and “StudyFLD.” I use descriptive statistics to compare the 
education levels of Xi-era officers with the education levels of Jiang and Hu-era officers. I also 
used a logit regression model to explore how education impacts high-level promotion chances 
under Xi and to what extent.  
“Study,” an ordinal variable that indicates an officer’s highest level of education 
achieved, can take values from “0” to “5.” I assigned a “0” to officers who only had middle 
school (the equivalent of 7th to 9th grade) educations, or only had military experience without any 
formal education. A “1” indicates a high school education (10th to 12th grade), a “2” indicates a 
degree from a 2- to 3-year vocational institution, a “3” indicates a 4-year college undergraduate 
degree, a “4” indicates a Master’s Degree, and a “5” indicates a Doctorate. I use a logit 
regression model to analyze the “Study” variable. 
“StudyFLD,” or “Study Field,” on the other hand, is a nominal variable that is only 
analyzed using descriptive statistics. “StudyFLD” indicates an officer’s field of study for his or 
her highest level of education achieved, and can take one of six values: Military Science, 
Business and Social Sciences, Engineering, Natural and Physical Sciences, Other (including 
double majors), and Unknown. Just like FOrigin, I opted to analyze a nominal variable using 
descriptive statistics instead of creating six dummy variables for a logit regression analysis. 




Based on the current literature, I propose the following hypotheses on how education may 
impact high-level PLA promotion chances: 
H3: Higher education levels will increase high-level PLA promotion chances under Xi. 
H4: High-level PLA officers have more experience in the natural and physical sciences under Xi 
than they did under Hu and Jiang.  
Independent Variable 04: Trans 
“Trans,” or “Transfer Experience,” is a dichotomous variable that examines the link 
between experience serving in multiple PLA units and high-level promotion chances. If an 
officer had experience serving in two or more units, including the PLA’s seven MRs, four 
General Departments, and different PLA services and branches, at or above the corps leader (正
軍級) grade, I assigned a value of “1” to the Trans variable. If not, I assigned a value of “0” to 
Trans. To collect this information, I obtained a comprehensive resumé for each officer in my 
dataset and checked to see if officers had experience serving in different danwei (单位), or work 
units, above the corps leader grade. 
For example, Wang Ning (王寧) has previously served in the Beijing MR at the MR 
deputy leader grade. However, he is now serving in the People’s Armed Police at the MR leader 
grade. Therefore, I consider Wang Ning to have transfer experience above the corps leader grade 
and assigned him a Trans score of 1. On the other hand, Hou Jizhen (侯繼振) is an officer who 
does not have transfer experience above the corps leader grade. Hou served in the Shenyang MR 
at the MR deputy leader grade from 2012 to 2015, and also has not served in any other danwei 
above the corps leader grade. I assigned Hou a Trans score of 0. 




I analyze “Trans” using descriptive statistics and a logit regression model. Based on the 
current literature, I propose the following hypothesis on how transfer experience may impact 
promotion chances: 
H5: Officers with experience serving in multiple PLA MRs, General Departments, or military 
services and branches at the corps leader grade or above are more likely to be promoted.124 
Independent Variable 05: CombatOps 
 “CombatOps,” or “Combat Operations Experience,” is a dichotomous variable that 
examines the relationship between combat experience and high-level promotion chances. If an 
officer had experience serving in a combat role during wartime, I assigned a “1” to CombatOps. 
If an officer had no such experience, I assigned a “0” to the variable. It is important to note that 
the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was the last time that China had fought a war and did not 
involve any PLAN, PLAAF, or PLASAF engagement with the Vietnamese.125 The last major 
PLA Air Force engagement was over the Taiwan Strait in 1958, and the last naval engagements 
were in the South China Sea in the 1980s.126 I analyze CombatOps using descriptive statistics 
and a logit regression model. As mentioned in my literature review, the number of officers with 
real combat experience is gradually declining due to age, making it difficult to predict how 
combat experience may affect high-level promotion chances under Xi. Nevertheless, based on 
information available in the current literature, I propose the following hypothesis regarding 
combat experience: 
                                                     
124 Ken Allen notes that officers are divided into five career paths and rarely serve in more than one of the PLA’s 
General Departments. The exception is the General Logistics Department director, who has usually been a political 
or operations officer in the past. Political officers can serve in any of the four departments; Kenneth Allen, in 
discussion with the author, March 20, 2015. 
125 David Stout, “The Last Time China Got into a Fight with Vietnam, it was a Disaster,” Time Magazine, May 15, 
2014, accessed March 23, 2016, http://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-south-china-sea/.  
126 Kenneth Allen, in discussion with the author, March 20, 2015. 




H6: Officers with real combat experience are still more likely to receive promotions under Xi. 
Independent Variable 06: CombatGrd 
 “CombatGrd,” or “Combat Grade,” is an ordinal variable that indicates the grade of an 
officer’s position during wartime, providing the officer has served in a combat role. CombatGrd 
can take values from 0 to 4. A “0” indicates that the officer does not have combat experience. A 
“1” indicates that the officer served as a soldier (战士) during wartime, a “2” indicates service at 
a billet between the Platoon Leader (正排级) and Regiment Leader (正团级) grades, a “3” 
indicates service at the Division Deputy Leader (副师级) and Division Leader (正师級) grades, 
and a “4” indicates service at or above the corps leader (正军级) grade. I analyze CombatGrd 
using a logit regression model only. Based on information in the current literature, I propose the 
following hypothesis on how combat rank may impact promotion chances: 
H7: Providing that an officer has combat experience, serving at higher grades during combat will 
improve promotion chances. 
Independent Variable 07: NCOps  
 “NCOps (called NCOps_M in the Spreadsheet),” or “Non-Combat Operation 
Experience,” is a cardinal variable that examines the relationship between experience in non-
combat operations and high-level promotion chances. This variable records the number of 
instances that an officer has led significant disaster relief operations, counterterrorism operations, 
joint training exercises, mass protest management exercises, and major military 
ceremonies/parades before Xi took power in November 2012. I define a “significant” exercise or 
operation as a military exercise or operation that has been widely reported in the Chinese 
domestic and/or international media. 




 I chose to only record officers’ non-combat operations before November 2012 to avoid 
including ex post facto non-combat operations. Unlike PLA rank promotions, which usually 
occur on set dates, grade promotions can occur at various, uncoordinated times. It is difficult to 
set a standardized cutoff date after November 2012 for collecting non-combat experience data 
because each officer in this dataset can be promoted prior to or after the arbitrary cutoff date I 
set.  
For example, assume that there are two PLA officers, General Liu and General Wang. 
Both General Liu and General Wang served at the corps leader grade as of November 2012 and 
led a major military ceremony in December 2013. However, General Liu was promoted to the 
MR Deputy Leader grade in January 2013 while General Wang remained at the corps leader 
grade until February 2014. If I record non-combat operations after November 2012, I would have 
to record the December 2013 military ceremony experience for both Generals Liu and Wang. 
This would be fine for General Wang because the military ceremony experience occurred before 
his promotion. However, this would not valid for General Liu, because he had already been 
promoted in January 2013, prior to the military ceremony. I would therefore be recording non-
combat experience after his promotion, which would reduce the accuracy of this analysis. 
The only viable alternative is to record non-combat experiences before November 2012, 
the month that Xi took power. This approach ensures that any non-combat experiences I record 
occur before an officer’s grade promotion date, if any, in the Xi era. The obvious flaw of this 
approach is that, for some officers, I am ignoring non-combat experiences falling after 
November 2012, but before the officer’s actual grade promotion date. Further study is required to 
analyze the effects of these most recent experiences. 




I analyze NCOps using descriptive statistics and a logit regression model. Based on 
information in the current literature, I propose the following hypothesis on how non-combat 
experience may impact promotion chances: 
H8: Officers with more non-combat experience are more likely to receive promotions under Xi. 
Independent Variable 08: Internatl 
“Internatl (called Internatl_M in the Spreadsheet),” or “International Experience,” is a 
cardinal variable that examines the link between officers’ international experiences and 
promotion chances. This variable records the number of instances that an officer has studied 
abroad in a foreign country, travelled officially to foreign nations, and hosted foreign 
government personnel, either individually or as part of a delegation before November 2012. As 
mentioned above, I only collected data on international experiences before November 2012 to 
avoid counting international experiences that occurred after promotions.  
The PLAN’s recent anti-piracy operations and escorts in the Gulf of Aden allow officers 
to gain vital international experience.127 Since these operations started in 2008, I was able to 
capture officer experience in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 to 2012, but I could not identify 
experiences past November 2012. As more Xi-era officers are promoted in the coming years, 
future studies can more accurately analyze international experience during the Gulf of Aden 
operations.  
I analyze Internatl using a logit regression model only, as Wang Shuai-Han did not 
include international experience in his study. Based on the current literature, I propose the 
following hypothesis on how international experience may impact promotion chances: 
                                                     
127 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “Six Years at Sea… and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and 
China’s Maritime Commons Presence,” (Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2015), 
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/07/six-years-at-sea-and-counting-gulf-of-aden-anti-piracy-and-chinas-
maritime-commons-presence/.  




H9: Officers with more international experience are more likely to receive promotions under Xi . 
Independent Variable 09: Command 
 “Command” is a nominal variable indicating the group army that an officer commanded 
at the corps leader (正军级) grade, if any. “Commanding” a group army entails serving as a 
Commander (司令员) or Political Commissar (政委) for any of China’s group armies at the 
corps leader grade. Command can take the following 24 values: 
- Shenyang MR: 23rd GA (eliminated in 2003), 64th GA (eliminated in 1998), 16th GA, 39th 
GA, 40th GA 
- Beijing MR: 24th GA (eliminated in 2003), 28th GA (eliminated in 1998), 63rd GA 
(eliminated in 2003), 27th GA, 38th GA, 65th GA 
- Jinan MR: 67th GA (eliminated in 1998), 20th GA, 26th GA, 54th GA 
- Nanjing MR: 1st GA, 12th GA, 31st GA 
- Lanzhou MR: 21st GA, 47th GA 
- Chengdu MR: 13th GA, 14th GA 
- Guangzhou MR: 41st GA, 42nd GA 
 Similar to FOrigin and StudyFLD, I only use descriptive statistics to analyze this 
variable. Based on James Mulvenon and Wang Shuai-Han’s findings, I propose the following 
hypothesis on how group army command may impact promotion chances: 
H10: Due to increasing PLA professionalism and growing opportunities for young men and 
women to join the PLA, I should see more balanced promotion rates among officers from 
different group armies under Xi.  




Independent Variable 10: MRegion 
 “MRegion,” or “Military Region Experience,” is a cardinal variable examining the 
relationship between personal connections and high-level promotion chances. For PLA army 
officers, this variable evaluates whether they have served in the Nanjing, Lanzhou, Shenyang, 
Xinjiang, and Tibet MRs or MDs. For PLAAF officers, this variable evaluates service in the 
Nanjing, Lanzhou, or Shenyang military region air forces. For Second Artillery officers, this 
variable evaluates service in Second Artillery bases that are geographically located within the 
military regions of interest. Unfortunately, I was unable to evaluate PLAN officers with this 
variable, since PLAN fleets do not have direct geographic connections with specific military 
regions. 
As mentioned in my literature review, many analysts believe that experience serving in 
the Nanjing MR, associated with Xi, is likely to increase promotion chances. I also expect 
serving in the Xinjiang or Tibet MDs to increase promotion chances due to increased 
opportunities for counterterrorism operations. On the other hand, experience serving in the 
Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are likely to decrease promotion chances, since these regions are 
associated with Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, two of the most prominent PLA officers indicted 
for corruption. I created two versions of the MRegion variable with different coding procedures: 
MRegion_Net and MRegion_G. As I describe in the next chapter, coding the MRegion variable 
differently produces different results. 
 To compile information for MRegion_Net, I first recorded the number of years each 
officer spent working in the Nanjing, Xinjiang, Tibet, Lanzhou, and Shenyang MRs or MDs. 
Then, I used the following formula to obtain net scores: MRegion_Net = (Years_Nanjing + 
Years_Xinjiang + Years_Tibet) – (Years_Lanzhou + Years_Shenyang). Through this formula, 




MRegion_Net will be negative if an officer spent more time in Lanzhou and Shenyang than he or 
she did in Nanjing, Xinjiang, and Tibet. A positive MRegion_Net score indicates that the reverse 
is true. 
 The MRegion_G variable is a more general overview of MRegion_Net and only 
examines if an officer’s service experiences are favorable or unfavorable. If an officer had a 
negative MRegion_Net score, I assigned a “0” to the MRegion_G variable. If an officer had not 
served in any of the MRs of interest and had a MRegion_Net score of “0”, I assigned a “1” to 
MRegion_G. Finally, if an officer had a positive MRegion_Net score, I assigned a “2” to 
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I propose the following hypothesis on how personal connections may impact promotion chances: 
H11: High-level experience serving in the Nanjing MR, Xinjiang MD, or Tibet MD is likely to 
benefit promotion chances, while experience serving in the Lanzhou or Shenyang MRs is likely 
to hurt promotion chances. 
Independent Variable 11: PCExp 
 “PCExp,” or “Political Commissar Experience,” is a dichotomous variable examining the 
relationship between serving as a political commissar (PC) and high-level promotion chances. If 
an officer had experience serving as a PC (政治委员, abbreviated as 政委) at or above the corps 




leader (正军级) grade before November 2012, I assigned a value of “1” to PCExp. If not, I 
assigned a value of “0” to this variable. I only analyze PCExp using a logit regression model. 
Based on the literature, I propose the following hypothesis on how political commissar service 
may affect promotion chances: 
H12: Assuming all other factors are equal, political commissars are no more likely to be 
promoted than other types of officers. 
Additional Variables: Tiger 
 Throughout my research, I discovered that several officers in my dataset were under 
investigation for corruption. I created an additional variable, Tiger, to track these officers. I 
assigned a value of “1” to this variable for officers currently under investigation and assigned 
zeroes to all other officers.  
Control Variables: Limit, MilRank1, GrdInitial 
 In addition to the variables above, I also created three “control variables” to account for 
differences between each grade. First, I hypothesize that officers at the MR leader grade (正大军
区级) will encounter more difficulties being promoted to the CMC member grade, simply 
because there are fewer openings on the CMC. To account for these restrictions, I created a 
dichotomous variable called “limit,” which is coded “1” for all officers initially at the MR leader 
grade as of November 2012. 
 Second, I created “MilRank1,” an ordinal variable, to account for the military ranks of 
each officer and determine if initial ranks can benefit or hurt grade promotions. As mentioned 
above, officers of the same grades can have different ranks. For example, corps leader-grade 
officers can be Major Generals or Lieutenant Generals. Using this control variable, I want to 
determine if a Lieutenant General who is a corps leader-grade officer is more likely to receive a 




grade promotion than a Major General who is also a corps leader-grade officer, simply because 
one has a higher rank than another. Although grades are more important than PLA ranks, this 
variable can determine if, all else being equal, a higher rank officer is more likely to receive a 
grade promotion. I coded MilRank1 as “1” for Major Generals (少将), “2” for Lieutenant 
Generals (中将), and “3” for Generals (上将). 
 Finally, different grades have different criteria for promotions. I created an additional 
ordinal variable, “GrdInitial,” to account for officers’ initial grades as of November 2012. I 
coded GrdInitial as “1” for corps leader grade officers, “2” for MR deputy leader officers, “3” for 
MR leader officers, “4” for CMC member-grade officers, and “5” for CMC Vice Chairmen. The 
next chapter of this thesis presents the results of my analysis. 
  




Chapter Three: Data Analysis 
In this chapter, I first present an overview of the average age of officers and number of 
promotions in the corps leader (正军级), MR deputy leader (副大军区级), and MR leader (正大
军区级) categories. Second, I use descriptive statistics to replicate Wang Shuai-Han’s prior 
study of PLA promotion patterns under Jiang and Hu using my own data from the Xi era. Third, 
I compare my results to Wang’s prior study in the Jiang and Hu eras and explore how Wang’s 
promotion indicators are changing in the Xi era. Finally, I create and analyze a logit regression 
model for my dataset of 275 high-level Xi-era officers to determine which of my variables can 
increase the likelihood of promotions, and to what extent. 
Data Overview 
 The following chart provides an overview of the average age of officers and number of 
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16 Officers Promoted 


















55 Officers Promoted 




  I found that while 49.1% of corps leader-grade officers received promotions to MR 
deputy leader under Xi, only 12.5% of MR deputy leader-grade officers received promotions to 
MR Leader. However, promotion prospects increased slightly for officers initially at the MR 
leader grade or higher. These findings cast doubt on my hypothesis that MR leader-grade officers 
are least likely to be promoted, simply because there are fewer CMC member positions.  
Replicating Wang Shuai-Han’s prior study using my data from the Xi era allows me to 
directly compare high-level PLA promotion patterns under Xi with high-level promotion patterns 




under Hu and Jiang. To do this, however, I needed to standardize and adjust my data to fit 
Wang’s data collection parameters. Wang Shuai-Han only collected data from officers at the MR 
deputy leader grade under Jiang and Hu, and analyzed whether these officers received 
promotions to the MR Leader grade.128 To replicate Wang’s data collection procedures, I created 
another copy of my master spreadsheet and eliminated all officers who were initially at the corps 
leader, MR leader, and CMC member, and vice chairmen grades. This allowed me to create a 
new dataset only containing officers at the MR deputy leader-grade under Xi. 
Comparative Analysis with Descriptive Statistics 
 In my comparative analysis, as mentioned above, I am only considering officers initially 
at the MR deputy leader-grade under Xi Jinping and evaluating which officers received grade 
promotions to MR leader. This enables a direct comparison with Wang Shuai-Han’s previous 
study. I analyze 128 officers from my complete dataset who meet these conditions. 
Education 
 Charts 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 compare the education levels of high-level Xi-era officers with the 
education levels of high-level Hu and Jiang-era officers. 
  
                                                     
128 Wang Shuai-Han, “Analysis of the Characteristics of High-level People’s Liberation Army Officials from the 
1980s to the Present,” 13. 





MR Deputy Leader-Grade PLA Officers’ Education Levels under Jiang and Hu 



























































MR Deputy Leader-Grade PLA Officers’ Education Levels under Xi (as of 8/2015) 







































Note regarding the charts above: When coding the “Study” variable, I incorporated officers who only had military 
experience and no education into the “middle school or below” category. However, Wang Shuai-Han included an 
“unknown” category in his descriptive analysis. To precisely replicate Wang’s coding procedures, I placed an officer 
into an “unknown” category if I was unable to expressly confirm that the officer only had a middle school education. 
In other words, I included officers with only military experience into the “unknown” category for the sole purpose of 
this descriptive analysis. However, my regression analysis still employs the coding system for “Study” that I 
outlined in Chapter Two. 
 
  
The proportion of MR deputy leader-grade PLA officers with college degrees rose by 
approximately 28% between the Hu and Xi eras, while this proportion only rose by 4.7% 
between the Jiang and Hu eras. Moreover, it is important to note that Xi has only been in power 
for approximately three years (2012 – 2015), whereas Hu’s leadership lasted approximately ten 
years (2002 – 2012). The percentage of MR deputy leader-grade officers with college degrees 




from just the three-year period between November 2012 and August 2015 is significantly higher 
than the percentage of MR deputy leader-grade officers with college degrees between 2002 and 
2012, demonstrating that professional education opportunities in the PLA are exponentially 
increasing. The proportion of Xi-era officers with college degrees is likely to further increase as 
Xi’s term in office progresses. 
 The proportion of MR deputy leader-grade officers with Master’s Degrees and 
Doctorates also increased under Xi. The proportion of officers with Master’s Degrees increased 
by 5.3% under Xi and the proportion of officers with Doctorates increased by 3.5%. However, as 
shown above, the proportion of officers with college degrees increased the most, compared to 
officers in every other category. On the other hand, the proportion of high-level officers with 
lower education credentials significantly decreased under Xi. For example, the proportion of 
officers with vocational degrees decreased by over 40%. These findings demonstrate the 
increasing importance of military education among high-level Xi-era officers. 
 Charts 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 compare the education levels of promoted, high-level Xi-era 
officers with the education levels of promoted, high-level Hu and Jiang-era officers. 
 
Chart 1.2.3 
Promoted PLA Officers’ Education Levels under Jiang and Hu 































































Promoted PLA Officers’ Education Levels under Xi (as of 8/2015) 








































The proportion of promoted officers with college degrees under Xi rose by 7.4%. This is 
lower than the increase in the proportion of all MR deputy leader-grade officers with college 
degrees under Xi. A possible reason is that education has always been an important consideration 
in promoting high-level officers, even under Jiang and Hu. However, officers under Xi simply 
have more access to higher education due to increased professionalization of the PLA in general. 
The proportion of promoted high-level officers with Master’s Degrees and Doctorates also 
increased in the Xi era. The proportion of officers with Master’s Degrees increased by 11.7% 
from the Hu era to the Xi era. While there were no promoted MR deputy leader-grade officers 
with Doctorates under Jiang and Hu, two promoted officers had Doctorates under Xi, marking a 
12.5% increase. These two officers are Qin Weijiang (秦衛江), who is serving in the PLA’s 
General Staff Department at the MR leader grade, and Liu Guozhi (劉國治), who is serving in 
the PLA’s General Armament Department at the MR leader grade. 
Charts 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 compare the fields of study for MR deputy leader-grade officers 
under Jiang, Hu, and Xi. 
 
  





High-Level PLA Officers’ Fields of Study under Jiang and Hu 
Source: Wang Shuai-Han: “1980年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官團特徵分析” 
P58 
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Total  263 174 53 66 16 60 3 8 
 
Chart 1.2.6 
High-Level PLA Officers’ Fields of Study under Xi (as of 8/2015) 
Source: Organized by the Author 
 
  Associate's  Bachelor's Master's Doctorate 


























































Total  2 57 26 7 
 




 Based on my hypotheses outlined above, I expect the proportion of high-level officers 
with degrees in the natural and physical sciences to increase under Xi. So far, there are no high-
level officers with Bachelor’s Degrees under Xi who have concentrated in the natural and 
physical sciences. However, at the Master’s Degree and Doctorate level, the proportion of 
officers with degrees in the natural and physical sciences have indeed increased. While there 
were no officers with Master’s Degrees and Doctorates in the natural and physical sciences under 
Jiang and Hu, the proportion of officers with Master’s degrees in the hard sciences under Xi 
increased to 19.2% and the proportion of officers with Doctorates in the hard sciences increased 
to 28.6% under Xi. This indicates that the proportion of MR deputy leader officers with natural 
and physical science degrees is increasing, but only among officers with advanced degrees. 
Additionally, Xi has only been in power for three years. The proportion of officers with degrees 
in the hard sciences is likely to continue improving throughout the near future. 
 Increasing education among high-level officers in the PLA also reflects the broader 
trends of increased access to higher education opportunities in China. The proportion of the 
PRC’s college-age population able to attend university has increased from 1.4 percent in 1978 to 
26.2 percent today.129 As more young people in China are able to attend university, the 
proportion of PLA officers with college undergraduate and advanced degrees will likely continue 
to increase. 
Combat Experience 
Charts 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 compare the combat experience of MR deputy leader-grade 
officers under Jiang and Hu with the combat experience of MR deputy leader grade officers 
under Xi. 
                                                     
129 “Education in China: Lessons for U.S. Educators,” study commissioned by the Asia Society, the Business 
Roundtable and the Council of Chief State School Officers, September 2005. 





High-Level PLA Officers with Combat Experience under Jiang and Hu  
Source: Wang Shuai-Han: “1980年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官團特徵分析” 
P65 
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(47.7%) 





38                          
(9.5%) 






High-Level PLA Officers with Combat Experience under Xi (as of 8/2015) 
Source: Organized by the Author 
  









33                    
(25.8%) 




According to Wang Shuai-Han, the proportion of officers with combat experience 
declined by 38.2% between Jiang and Hu. My findings indicate that the proportion of MR deputy 
leader-grade officers with combat experience once again increased by 16.3% under Xi. This may 
be because Xi has only been in office for slightly more than three years, and so far, the Xi-era 
CMC has not promoted many officers. Therefore, many older MR deputy leader officers serving 
under Xi also likely served during the Jiang and Hu eras. These older officers are more likely to 
have combat experience and may constitute a disproportionally high percentage of all high-level 
Xi-era officers. As the Xi-era CMC promotes more corps leader-grade officers to the MR deputy 
leader grade in the coming years, and as older officers retire, the proportion of all MR deputy 
leader-grade officers with combat experience is likely to decline.  




Even so, I see a slightly different pattern when I look at charts 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 below, 
which only evaluate the combat experience for promoted officers under Jiang, Hu, and Xi. 
 
Chart 1.3.3 
Promoted PLA Officers with Combat Experience under Jiang and Hu  
Source: Wang Shuai-Han: “1980年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官團特徵分析” 
P66 
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(94.1%) 







Promoted PLA Officers with Combat Experience under Xi (as of 8/2015) 
Source: Organized by the Author 
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(37.5%) 




These two charts above send a different message. While the proportion of promoted 
officers with combat experience significantly rose between the Jiang and Hu eras, this proportion 
declined by 56.6% from the Hu era to the Xi era. Xi-era combat experience has significantly 
decreased among promoted officers. Combat experience may be becoming less important for 
high-level promotions under Xi. To explore this possibility further, I use my logit regression 
model to analyze combat experience later in the chapter. 




Non-Combat Operations Experience 
Charts 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 compare the non-combat operations experience of MR deputy 




High Ranking PLA Officers with Non-Combat Experience under Jiang and Hu  
Source: Wang Shuai-Han: “1980年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官團特徵分析” 
P67 
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(16.9%) 
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(21.1%) 






High Ranking PLA Officers with Non-Combat Experience under Xi (as of 8/2015) 
Source: Organized by the Author (includes experience leading military parades and 
ceremonies) 
  









32                    
(25.0%) 




 According to my findings above, the proportion of officers with non-combat experience 
under Xi increased slightly by 3.9% from the Hu era. Again, as Xi’s term progresses, the 
proportion of officers with non-combat experience is likely to continue increasing. I analyze the 
degree of correlation between non-combat experience and grade promotion chances using a logit 
regression model later in this chapter. 





Charts 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 compare the transfer experience of MR deputy leader-grade 




PLA Officers’ Experience Serving in Multiple Danwei under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
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PLA Officers’ Experience Serving in Multiple Danwei at or above the corps leader Grade 
under Xi Jinping (as of 8/2015) 












89                     
(69.6%) 




                                                     
130 For more information about coding procedures and the definition of danwei, please consult the Transfer 
Experience section of Chapter 2. 




 The proportion of MR deputy leader-grade officers with experience serving in two or 
more PLA danwei, including the PLA’s seven MRs, Four General Departments, and different 
PLA services and branches at or above the corps leader grade rose by 22.8% between the Hu and 
Xi eras. Charts 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 below focuses this analysis on the proportion of promoted officers 
with transfer experience under Jiang, Hu, and Xi. 
 
Chart 1.5.3 
Promoted PLA Officers’ Experience Serving in Multiple Danwei under Jiang and Hu  













48                            
(61.5%) 
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Promoted PLA Officers’ Experience Serving in Multiple Danwei at or above the corps 
leader Grade under Xi (as of 8/2015) 
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(87.5%) 








 These charts demonstrate that the proportion of promoted officers with transfer 
experience has remained high since the Jiang era. This proportion further increased from 58.8% 
of promoted officers during the Hu era to almost 90% of officers in the Xi era. This number 
should continue to rise through the next several years of Xi’s leadership. 
Provinces of Family Origin 
Chart 1.6.1 examines the proportions of all MR deputy leader-grade PLA officers with 
family origins in each of China’s provinces under Jiang, Hu, and Xi. This chart lists China’s 
provinces in alphabetical order. 
  





Provinces of Family Origin for MR deputy leader Officers under Jiang, Hu, and Xi 
Source for Jiang and Hu-era Data: Wang Shuai-Han: “1980年代後期至今解放軍高階軍官
團特徵分析,” P78 





Number of Jiang  
Era Officers 
Number of Hu  
Era Officers 
 
Number of Xi 
Era Officers 
Anhui  17 (3.8%)  24 (6.0%) 11 (8.6%) 
Beijing City  7 (1.6%) 6 (1.5%) 2 (0.8%) 
Chongqing 
City  4 (0.9%)  3 (0.8%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
Fujian  5 (1.1%)  10 (2.5%) 2 (1.6%) 
Gansu  3 (0.7%)  4 (1.0%) 2 (1.6%) 
Guangdong  4 (0.9%)  4 (1.0%) 1 (0.8%) 
Guangxi  0 (0.0%)  1 (0.3%) 1 (0.8%) 
Guizhou  1 (0.2%)  1 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Hebei  64 (14.2%)  42 (10.5%) 14 (10.9%) 
Heilongjiang  19 (4.2%)  10 (2.5%) 3 (2.3%) 
Henan  26 (5.8%)  32 (8.0%) 11 (8.6%) 
Hubei  27 (6.0%)  22 (5.5%) 8 (6.2%) 
Hunan  25 (5.5%)  21 (5.3%) 6 (4.7%) 
Inner 
Mongolia  4 (0.9%)  1 (0.3%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
Jiangsu  36 (8.0%)  37 (9.3%) 14 (10.9%) 
Jiangxi  5 (1.1%)  7 (1.8%) 2 (1.6%) 
Jilin  12 (2.7%)  6 (1.5%) 2 (1.6%) 
Liaoning  27 (6.0%)  22 (5.5%) 9 (7.0%) 
Ningxia  1 (0.2%)  0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Shaanxi  9 (2.0%)  14 (3.5%) 2 (1.6%) 
Shandong  100 (22.2%)  80 (20.1%) 28 (22.0%) 
Shanghai 
City  8 (1.8%)  4 (1.0%) 
 
0 (0.0%)  
Shanxi  16 (3.5%)  12 (3.0%) 1 (0.8) 
Sichuan  11 (2.4%)  13 (3.3%) 2 (1.6%) 
Tianjin City  4 (0.9%)  2 (0.5%) 1 (0.8%) 
Yunnan  4 (0.9%)  5 (1.3%) 1 (0.8%) 
Zhejiang  11 (2.4%)  10 (2.5%) 5 (3.9%) 
Unknown  1 (0.2%)  6 (1.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
Total  451  399 128 
 




The proportion of high-level PLA officers from Shandong Province has remained high 
ever since the Jiang era. In line with Wang Shuai-Han’s hypothesis, I expected this proportion to 
decrease under Xi due to increasing PLA professionalization. Although the proportion of 
Shandong officers decreased slightly by 2.1% between the Jiang and Hu eras (80 out of 399 total 
officers under Hu), this proportion rose again by 1.9% between the Hu and Xi eras (28 out of 128 
officers under Xi). Although the proportion of Xi-era officers from Shandong seems to be 
increasing, this period of study is still in the early stages of the Xi era, and the percent of 
Shandong officers may continue to decrease as the CMC promotes more MR deputy leader-
grade officers. Xi-era officers’ family origins remained fairly constant when compared with the 
Hu era, and the proportion of officers from any province did not increase or decrease by more 
than 2.7%. 
Group Army Command 
Charts 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 analyze the proportions of all MR deputy leader-grade PLA 
officers who have commanded each of China’s group armies under Jiang, Hu, and Xi. As 
explained above, each of China’s seven military regions contains several group armies. The 
military regions in these charts are listed in their protocol order based on their relative 
importance and dates established: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and 
Chengdu.131 
  
                                                     
131 James Mulvenon, “Rearranging the Desk Chairs on the Liaoning: The PLA Once Again Considers 
Reorganization,” Hoover Institution, Stanford University, March 14, 2014, accessed March 23, 2016, 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM43JM.pdf, 2.  





Group Army Origin of MR deputy leader Officers under Jiang and Hu 





Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao 
N = Percent N = Percent 
Shenyang 
23rd (Eliminated in 2003) 9 5.3% 5 3.2% 
64th (Eliminated in 1998) 5 3.0% 3 1.9% 
16th 8 4.7% 8 5.1% 
39th 8 4.7% 5 3.2% 
40th 5 3.0% 4 2.5% 
Total 35 20.7% 25 15.9% 
Beijing 
24th (Eliminated in 2003) 6 3.6% 0 0.0% 
28th (Eliminated in 1998) 3 1.8% 0 0.0% 
63rd (Eliminated in 2003) 7 4.1% 6 3.8% 
27th 7 4.1% 6 3.8% 
38th 8 4.7% 4 2.5% 
65th 5 3.0% 8 5.1% 
Total 36 21.3% 24 15.3% 
Lanzhou 
21st 7 4.1% 9 5.7% 
47th 10 5.9% 10 6.4% 
Total 17 10.1% 19 12.1% 
Jinan 
67th (Eliminated in 1998) 9 5.3% 5 3.2% 
20th 6 3.6% 7 4.5% 
26th 5 3.0% 4 2.5% 
54th 8 4.7% 10 6.4% 
Total 28 16.6% 26 16.6% 
Nanjing 
1st 11 6.5% 10 6.4% 
12th 8 4.7% 6 3.8% 
31st 7 4.1% 5 3.2% 
Total 26 15.3% 31 19.7% 
Guangzhou 
41st 7 4.1% 10 6.4% 
42nd 9 5.3% 8 5.1% 
Total 16 9.5% 18 11.5% 
Chengdu 
13th 5 3.0% 7 4.5% 
14th 6 3.6% 7 4.5% 
Total 11 6.5% 14 8.9% 
TOTAL - 169 - 157 - 
 
 





Group Army Command for MR deputy leader Officers under Xi 






N = Percent 
Shenyang 
23rd (Eliminated in 2003) 0 0.0% 
64th (Eliminated in 1998) 0 0.0% 
16th 2 6.3% 
39th 2 6.3% 
40th 1 3.1% 
Total 5 15.6% 
Beijing 
24th (Eliminated in 2003) 0 0.0% 
28th (Eliminated in 1998) 0 0.0% 
63rd (Eliminated in 2003) 0 0.0% 
27th 1 3.1% 
38th 4 12.5% 
65th 2 6.3% 
Total 7 21.9% 
Lanzhou 
21st 0 0.0% 
47th 2 6.3% 
Total 2 6.3% 
Jinan 
67th (Eliminated in 1998) 0 0.0% 
20th 2 6.3% 
26th 1 3.1% 
54th 2 6.3% 
Total 5 15.6% 
Nanjing 
1st 2 6.3% 
12th 3 9.4% 
31st 1 3.1% 
Total 6 18.8% 
Guangzhou 
41st 2 6.3% 
42nd 2 6.3% 
Total 4 12.5% 
Chengdu 
13th 2 6.3% 
14th 1 3.1% 
Total 3 9.4% 








The proportion of officers who have commanded group armies (including serving as 
political commissars for these group armies) in each MR remained fairly constant between the 
Hu and Xi eras, with two exceptions. First, the proportion of MR deputy leader grade officers 
who have commanded group armies in the Beijing MR increased by 6.6% under Xi. Second, the 
proportion of officers with command experiences in the Lanzhou MR decreased by 5.8% under 
Xi. From these findings, it appears that the proportion of officers who have served in each group 
army under Xi is becoming more skewed, rather than more balanced. I discuss possible 
explanations for this phenomena in the next chapter when I analyze whether my hypotheses were 
supported by my findings. 
Logit Regression Analysis 
As mentioned above, a logit regression analysis for my dataset of 275 high-level Xi-era 
officers allows me to determine which of my variables can increase the likelihood of promotions, 
and to what extent. First, I provide an overview of my logit regression model and my statistically 
significant independent variables. Next, I describe two additional STATA commands, “listcoef” 
and “mchange,” that will help analyze each variable in detail. Finally, I provide a comprehensive 
analysis on how each of my statistically significant independent variables can increase or 
decrease the likelihood of grade promotions under Xi.  
Chart 2.1.1 provides an overview of my logit regression model and statistically 
significant independent variables. Since two officers in my dataset were missing information for 
one or more of my independent variables, I was only able to create a logit regression model for 
273 out of 275 total officers. However, this should not significantly alter the results of my 
analysis, as I am still considering 99.3% of my entire dataset in my logit regression analysis.  





Logit Regression Model 
Source: STATA 14132 
 
 
 At the p < .05 level, the “MRegionNet” variable has a statistically significant correlation 
with “GrdChange,” my dependent variable. “Study” and “Trans” are significant at the p < .05 
level. “Age” is significant at the p < .01 level. Additionally, all three of my control variables, 
“milrank1,” “grdinitial,” and “limit,” are statistically significant (p < .01). However, I cannot 
easily analyze the extent of each independent variable’s correlation with “GrdChange” using the 
chart above because the odds coefficients in a logit regression model are expressed 
logarithmically.133 
                                                     
132 My STATA dataset can be accessed at http://bit.ly/1V2XeIi.  
133 J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, “Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using STATA,” 
(College Station: STATACorp, 2014), 229. 




 The “listcoef” command in STATA is included within the SPost suite of commands 
designed by Professors Jeremy Freese and J. Scott Long.134 Listcoef converts the log-odds 
coefficients in a logit regression model into regular odds coefficients using the following 
formula: Odds coefficient = e ^ (Log-odds coefficient). In this formula, Listcoef assumes that the 
Log-odds coefficients are expressed in terms of the natural logarithm (Ln) with a base of e, 
where e is approximately 2.71828. Chart 2.1.2 provides an overview of my independent 
variables’ regular odds coefficients after using the Listcoef command. 
  
                                                     
134 J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, “Post-Estimation Commands for Regression Models for Categorical and Count 
Outcomes,” STATACorp, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.stata.com/meeting/1nasug/freese.pdf.  





Logit Regression Model: Listcoef 
Source: STATA 14 
 
 After converting my findings to regular odds coefficients, I can interpret how changing 
an independent variable changes the odds of GrdChange being one.135 In the next section of this 
chapter, I explain my specific findings for each of my variables. 
 The “mchange” command, another tool in the SPost suite, allows me to analyze how 
certain discrete changes in the independent variable can impact the odds of the dependent 




                                                     
135 J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, “Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using STATA,” 
(College Station: STATACorp, 2014), 229. 
136 Ibid, 246. 






Logit Regression Model: MChange 
Source: STATA 14 
 
 





 The average predictions section in the chart above illustrates the average predicted 
probability for each officer in this dataset having a GrdChange score of 0 (not promoted) and 1 
(promoted). If I generated a predicted probability of GrdChange = 0 for each officer in this 
dataset and took the average of these probabilities, a high-level PLA official under Xi has an 
average probability of 0.703 (or a 70.3% chance) of not being promoted. On the other hand, if I 
generated a predicted probability of GrdChange = 1 for each of the 273 officers and then took the 
average of these numbers, a high-level PLA official under Xi would only have an average 
probability of 0.297 (or a 29.7% chance) of being promoted. The mchange command allows me 
to analyze how an increase of 1 for each independent variable impacts the average predicted 
probability of promotions. In the next section of this thesis, I analyze each of my statistically 




significant independent variables using a combination of the “listcoef” and “mchange” 
commands. 
Age 
Drawing from the odds coefficients in Chart 2.1.2, I see that as a high-level officer gets 
one year older under Xi, his or her odds of being promoted decrease by a factor of .804, holding 
all other variables constant (p < .01). Additionally, Chart 2.1.3 indicates that if I increase the 
“age” variable for each of the 273 officers in this dataset by one year, the average predicted 
probability for promotions among all officers would decrease by .024 (from 29.7% to 27.3%). 
Education 
Based on the listcoef results, each additional level of education a high-level Xi-era officer 
has achieved increases his or her odds of being promoted by a factor of 1.413, holding all other 
variables constant (p < .05). Furthermore, if I increase the “study” variable for each of the 
officers in this dataset by one level, the average predicted probability for promotions among all 
officers would increase by .035 (from 29.7% to 33.2%). 
Experience Serving in Different Work Units 
Chart 2.1.2 indicates that high-level officers with experience serving in different PLA 
danwei at or above the corps leader grade are 2.639 times more likely to be promoted than 
officers without such experience, holding all other variables constant (p < .05). Additionally, if I 
increase the “trans” variable for each of the officers in this dataset by one, the average predicted 
probability for promotions among all officers would increase by .041 (from 29.7% to 33.8%). 
Geographic Areas of Service and Personal Connections 
A logit regression analysis of the MRegionNet variable leads to surprising implications 
about how geographic areas of service and personal connections can impact high-level PLA 




promotion chances under Xi. Chart 2.1.2 indicates that as a high-level Xi-era officer’s 
“MRegion” score increases by one, that officer’s odds of promotion will decrease by a factor of 
0.832 (p < .05). Similarly, Chart 2.1.3 indicates that, if I increase the “MRegion” variable for 
each of the officers in this dataset by one, the average predicted probability for promotions 
among all officers would decrease by .021 (from 29.7% to 27.6%). 
Based on my coding procedures from Chapter 2, an officer with more years of service at 
or above the corps leader grade in the Nanjing MR, Xinjiang MD, and Tibet MD would have a 
higher MRegion score, while an officer with more years of service in Lanzhou or Shenyang 
would have a lower MRegion score. While I hypothesized that a higher MRegion score would 
boost promotion chances, the results of my analysis seem to indicate the opposite, that high-level 
Xi-era officers with experience serving in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to be 
promoted.  
As mentioned above in Chapter 2, I created an additional version of the MRegionNet 
variable with different coding procedures to clarify the impact of the variable on promotion 
chances. Coding procedures for the alternative variable, MRegion_G, are outlined in the 



















Logit Regression Model: MRegion_G 
Source: STATA 14 
 
 
Based on this model, simply using the MRegion_G scores in a logit regression analysis 
(obtained by generalizing the MRegion_Net variable) does not produce statistically significant 
results. It is apparent, therefore, that the MRegion variable’s statistical significance depends on 
its coding procedures. I evaluate possible explanations for these findings in the next chapter. 
Control Variables 
My control variables, “milrank1,” “grdinitial,” and “limit,” all had statistically significant 
results at the p < .01 level. Based on my specific dataset from the Xi era, it seems that as 
officers’ military ranks increased, grade promotion chances also significantly increased. These 




findings were not surprising, as the vast majority of officers in my dataset were Lieutenant 
Generals, and Lieutenant Generals can serve at the corps leader, MR deputy leader, or MR leader 
grades. Additionally, my findings demonstrate that officers who were initially at the MR leader 
grade (coded 1 for the “limit” variable) were more likely to be promoted to the CMC member 
level. I initially expected these promotions to be less likely due to fewer open slots on the CMC, 
but the limited number of CMC member grade billets apparently did not interfere with 
promotions at the very highest levels, at least among officers in my dataset. I evaluate possible 
explanations for these findings in my next chapter. Since many officers initially at the MR leader 
grade were at the highest PLA rank (full General), their promotions also factored into the 
milrank1 variable. Finally, my findings for the “grdinitial” variable were not surprising. As an 
officer’s grade increases, it becomes more difficult for that officer to receive promotions. 
  




Chapter Four: Findings and Policy Implications 
 I begin this chapter by analyzing whether each of my hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 
are supported by my statistical analysis. Next, I evaluate several unexpected findings in my study 
and suggest possible reasons for these outcomes. Finally, I highlight several findings that can be 
useful to policymakers and analysts in the U.S. government. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 01 
H1: Younger, high-level officers are more likely to receive grade promotions under Xi than 
older officers. 
Supported. 
This hypothesis is supported by my statistical analysis. As described above, as a high-
level officer gets one year older under Xi, his or her odds of being promoted decrease by a factor 
of .804, holding all other variables constant (p < .01). Additionally, if I increase the “age” 
variable for each of the 273 officers in this dataset by one year, the average predicted probability 
for promotions among all officers would decrease by .024 (from 29.7% to 27.3%).. 
Hypothesis 02 
H2: Due to increasing PLA professionalism and growing opportunities for young men and 
women to join the PLA, I should see more balanced promotion rates among officers from 
different provinces under Xi. 
Not Supported. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. Chart 1.6.1 demonstrates that, 
if anything, promotion rates among high-level officers from different provinces are becoming 
less balanced under Xi. The percentage of high-level officers with family origins in Shandong 




slightly increased from the Hu era to the Xi era. Additionally, several underrepresented 
provinces, ARs, and municipalities, like Chongqing City, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and 
Shanghai City, had one or two high-level officers under Jiang and Hu with family ties. However, 
the percentage of high-level Xi-era officers with family ties in these provinces dropped to zero. 
This demonstrates that high-level officers from Shandong Province are even more prevalent 
under Xi than they were under Hu. This may change in the future as Xi’s term progresses and 
more high-level officers are promoted. 
Hypothesis 03 
H3: Higher education levels will increase the likelihood of high-level PLA promotions under Xi. 
Supported. 
This hypothesis is supported by my statistical analysis. The proportion of MR deputy 
leader-grade PLA officers with college degrees rose by approximately 28% between the Hu and 
Xi-eras, while this proportion only rose by 4.7% between the Jiang and Hu eras. Additionally, 
the percentage of promoted, Xi-era officers with college degrees rose by approximately 7% from 
the Hu era. According to my logit regression analysis, each additional level of education a high-
level Xi-era officer has achieved increases his or her odds of being promoted by a factor of 
1.413, holding all other variables constant (p < .05). Also, if I increase the “study” variable for 
each of the officers in this dataset by one level, the average predicted probability for promotions 
among all officers would increase by .035 (from 29.7% to 33.2%). These findings may be due to 
increased educational opportunities for all Chinese citizens, but regardless, it is important to note 
that education in the highest levels of the PLA is increasing. 





H4: High-level PLA officers have more experience in the natural and physical sciences under Xi 
than they did under Hu and Jiang. 
Supported. 
 This hypothesis is supported by my statistical analysis. After comparing the education 
levels of high-level Xi-era officers in my dataset to high-level Jiang and Hu-era officers in Wang 
Shuai-Han’s dataset, it is clear that high-level Xi-era officers have more experience in the natural 
and social sciences, especially among officers with advanced degrees. According to Chart 1.2.5, 
at the Master’s Degree and Doctorate level, the proportion of officers with degrees in the natural 
and physical sciences have indeed increased. While there were no officers with Master’s Degrees 
and Doctorates in the natural and physical sciences under Jiang and Hu, the proportion of 
officers with Master’s degrees in the hard sciences under Xi increased to 19.2% and the 
proportion of officers with Doctorates in the hard sciences increased to 28.6% under Xi. 
Hypothesis 05 
H5: Officers with experience serving in multiple PLA MRs, Four General Departments, or 
military services and branches at the corps leader grade or above are more likely to be promoted. 
Supported. 
This hypothesis is supported by my statistical analysis. The proportion of MR deputy 
leader- grade officers with experience serving in two or more PLA units, including the PLA’s 
seven MRs, Four General Departments, and different PLA services, branches at or above the 
corps leader grade rose by 22.8% between the Hu and Xi eras. If I narrow this analysis to only 
promoted, MR deputy leader officers under Xi, I see that approximately 90% of these promoted 
officers had transfer experience, according to this thesis’s definition. According to my logit 




regression analysis, high-level officers with experience serving in different PLA services and 
branches at or above the corps leader grade are 2.639 times more likely to be promoted than 
officers without such experience, holding all other variables constant (p < .05). Additionally, if I 
increase the “trans” variable for each of the officers in this dataset by one, the average predicted 
probability for promotions among all officers would increase by .041 (from 29.7% to 33.8%). 
Hypothesis 06 
H6: Officers with real combat experience are still more likely to receive promotions under Xi. 
Not Supported. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. From my descriptive 
statistical analysis above, I see that combat experience has increased among all MR deputy 
leader officers under Xi. However, if I tailor this analysis to only those Xi-era officers who were 
promoted from the MR deputy leader to the MR leader grade, I see that the proportion of 
promoted officers with combat experience significantly declined by approximately 55% from the 
Hu era to the Xi era. Additionally, my logit regression analysis demonstrates that there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between combat experience and high-level promotion 
chances, at least so far, under Xi.  
Hypothesis 07 
H7: Providing that an officer has combat experience, serving at higher grade during combat will 
improve promotion chances. 
Not Supported. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. Similar to hypothesis 06, my 
logit regression analysis demonstrates that the relationship between CombatRnk and GrdChange 
was not statistically significant. 





H8: Officers with more non-combat experience are more likely to receive promotions under Xi. 
Not Supported. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. The descriptive statistical 
analysis does show that the proportion of officers with non-combat experience under Xi 
increased slightly by approximately 4% from the Hu era. However, my logit regression analysis 
demonstrates that there is no statistically significant relationship between non-combat experience 
and GrdChange, at least so far, under Xi. This may change in the future as Xi’s term progresses 
and more officers are promoted. 
Hypothesis 09 
H9: Officers with more international experience are more likely to receive promotions under Xi. 
Not Supported. 
 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. As Wang Shuai-Han did not 
include international experience as an independent variable in his descriptive study, I solely 
analyzed international experience with my logit regression model. The analysis demonstrates that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between international experience and GrdChange. 
There is a debate in the current literature about whether international experience is likely to 
increase high-level promotion chances, and so far, it seems to be the case that international 
experience has little or no effect on promotions.  
Hypothesis 10 
H10: Due to increasing PLA professionalism and growing opportunities for young men and 
women to join the PLA, I should see more balanced promotion rates among officers from 
different group armies under Xi. 





 This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. Chart 1.7.2 demonstrates that 
the distribution of high-level officers who have commanded different group armies is becoming 
less balanced than the distribution of officers under Hu. It is much more likely for a high-level 
Xi-era officer to have commanded a group army in the Beijing or Nanjing MR. Indeed, the 
standard deviation of the percentage of officers who have served in each MR under Hu is 3.64, 
while this standard deviation increased to approximately 5.3 under Xi.  
Hypothesis 11 
H11: High-level experience serving in the Nanjing MR, Xinjiang MD, or Tibet MD is likely to 
benefit promotion chances, while experience serving in the Lanzhou or Shenyang MRs is likely 
to hurt promotion chances. 
Not Supported – The reverse is true! 
This hypothesis is not supported by my statistical analysis. Indeed, the reverse appears to 
be true, that high-level experience serving in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MR is likely to increase 
promotion chances. As explained above, there seems to be a statistically significant negative 
correlation between the MRegion variable and GrdChange. As a high-level Xi-era officer’s 
“MRegion” score increases by one, that officer’s odds of promotion will decrease by a factor of 
0.832 (p < .05). Additionally, if I increase the “MRegion” variable for each of the officers in this 
dataset by one, the average predicted probability for promotions among all officers would 
decrease by .086 .021 (from 29.7% to 27.6%). 
Based on my coding procedures, an officer with more years of service at or above the 
corps leader grade in the Nanjing, Xinjiang, and Tibet MRs or districts would have a higher 
MRegion score, while an officer with more years of service in Lanzhou or Shenyang would have 




a lower MRegion score. While I hypothesized that a higher MRegion score would boost 
promotion chances, the results of my analysis indicate the opposite, that high-level Xi-era 
officers with experience serving in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to be 
promoted.  
Hypothesis 12 
H12: Assuming all other factors are equal, political commissars are no more likely to be 
promoted than other types of officers. 
Supported. 
 This hypothesis is supported by my statistical analysis. My logit regression analysis 
found no statistically significant relationship between the PCexp variable and GrdChange. There 
is a debate in the current literature about whether political commissars are more likely to receive 
promotions than other officers, and these findings provide evidence that, holding all other 
variables constant, political commissars are not more likely to receive high-level promotions 
under Xi. 
Unexpected Findings 
 My statistical analysis led to several unexpected findings. In this section, I evaluate 
possible reasons for these outcomes and suggest several areas of additional study that can clarify 
the impact of these variables on high-level PLA promotion chances under Xi. 
Personal Connections 
 My findings for the MRegion variable were unexpected. Serving in the Nanjing MR, 
Xinjiang MD, and Tibet MD not only failed to boost promotion chances, but serving in the 
Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs, associated with Xi’s political opponents, seemed to increase the 




likelihood of high-level promotions. There are several possibilities that can explain these 
findings. 
 The Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs may have become more strategically significant under 
Xi. The CMC, or Xi himself, may consider experience serving in Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs to 
be highly valuable when considering which high-level officers should be promoted. The 
Lanzhou MR contains the largest physical area of any MR, as well as nuclear research, missile 
testing facilities, and extensive oil reserves.137 Additionally, while serving specifically in the 
Xinjiang MD failed to boost promotion chances, the Lanzhou MR contains the Xinjiang MD, 
which has the grade of MR deputy leader rather than the normal grade of corps leader, and may 
be responsible for coordinating broader counterterrorism opportunities, especially with “mass 
group incidents” on the rise in recent years.138  
According to analysts, the Shenyang MR “is the second most important MR” due to 
boarders with the Russian Far East, North Korea, and the Chinese capital region of Beijing and 
Tianjin.139 Additionally, the Shenyang MR is known for its entrepreneurship and innovation. 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, as of 1997, “seventy army-run 
factories produced approximately 20% of China’s cars and trucks.”140 The Liaoning Songliao 
Vehicle Group was the most successful of these seventy companies, had very close ties with the 
Shenyang MR, and is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.141 It is possible that the CMC 
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considers counterterrorism experience, entrepreneurship, and experience serving in China’s 
capital region to be more important than possible connections to Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. 
 Since I observed that officers who have served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are 
more likely to be promoted than officers who have served in the Nanjing MR, I can also infer 
that favorable geographic Guanxi relationships with Xi are having very little impact on 
promotions. There are three main explanations for this phenomenon. First, the growing 
professionalization of the PLA could simply be reducing the effect of personal, political, and 
geographical connections on promotion chances. In other words, Xi’s personal connections in the 
Nanjing MR are not important enough to influence promotion chances. The second possibility is 
more politically significant: it may be that Xi does not have sufficient personal control over the 
PLA to prevent high-level officers who have served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs from 
receiving promotions. Third, Xi may be deliberately reducing the percentage of Nanjing MR 
officers who receive promotions to avoid allegations of nepotism. At the very least, I can see that 
favorable geographic Guanxi relationships do not increases the chances of high-level PLA 
promotions under Xi. 
 It is important to note that the MRegion variable in this thesis operationalizes personal 
connections in the PLA by analyzing geographic Guanxi between high-level officers and Xi 
himself. Given time and financial constraints, it was impossible to more directly analyze Guanxi 
connections between PLA officers in this thesis. With additional resources, it may be possible to 
specifically define and analyze the degrees of personal connections between each of the 275 
officers in my dataset. I can obtain this information through the CCP Elite Database by 
evaluating which officers have served in the same danwei and went to the same universities, and 
then using this information to map out different “cliques” of officers. It may also be possible to 




travel to China and conduct personal interviews with retired PLA officers to fill information 
gaps. Collecting this additional information about personal connections in a future study will 
allow me to create and define variables that can more accurately illustrate the impact of personal 
connections on high-level PLA promotions under Xi. 
Combat Experience, Non-Combat Experience, and International Experience 
 It was also surprising that the combat experience, non-combat experience, and 
international experience variables all had negligible impacts on PLA promotion chances under 
Xi. According to multiple studies in the literature, combat experience and non-combat 
experience can significantly boost high-level PLA promotion chances. A possible explanation is 
that Xi has only been in power for approximately three years (2012 – 2015) and the CMC has not 
had the chance to promote many officers. These findings may change as Xi’s term in office 
progresses. 
Control Variables 
 According to my logit regression analysis, my “limit” control variable also led to 
unexpected results. Officers who were initially at the MR leader grade (coded 1 for the “limit” 
variable) were more likely to be promoted to the CMC member grade level under Xi. I expected 
these promotions to be less likely due to fewer open slots on the CMC, but the limited number of 
CMC member-grade billets apparently did not interfere with promotions at the very highest 
levels. One possible explanation is that promotions at the highest levels likely happened at the 
beginning of Xi’s tenure. To consolidate his power, Xi most likely wanted to replace old, Hu-era 
officers with a new cohort of CMC officers who were loyal to the Commander in Chief. To fill 
Hu-era CMC vacancies, Xi most likely promoted officers from the highest grades. As Xi’s term 




progresses, it is likely that fewer CMC members will need to be replaced. Therefore, officers 
from the highest grades may no longer receive advantages in promotions in the next few years.  
Implications for U.S. Policymakers and Analysts 
 This study provides several implications that can be useful for policymakers and analysts 
in the U.S. government to better understand and respond to increasing PLA professionalization. 
This study also provides valuable insight into Xi’s degree of personal authority to control the 
PLA. 
Military Education 
 First, the PLA is continuing its trend of promoting younger and more educated officers. 
As analyzed above, the percentage of MR deputy leader grade officers with college degrees only 
rose by approximately 5% between 2002 and 2012. However, after Xi took power, the 
percentage of MR deputy leader-grade officers with college degrees rose by approximately 28% 
between 2012 and 2015, marking more than a fivefold increase over just a three-year period. 
Military education is clearly a core priority for the CMC in light of the fenfa youwei strategy and 
education levels will likely continue to increase in the coming years. The number of high-level 
PLA officers with advanced degrees in science and technology under Xi is also significantly 
increasing. 
 An exponential increase in the amount of young PLA officers with college degrees, 
especially in the hard sciences, poses challenges to the United States, but also provides 
opportunities for further engagement. Increasing education in the PLA, especially in the natural 
and physical sciences, will facilitate Chinese cyberespionage, cybertheft, and asymmetric space-
based operations against the U.S. and other East Asian allies. Currently, there appears to be a 
shortage of PLA personnel with the necessary cybersecurity and cyberwarfare skills. The 




Diplomat reports that PLA officers are “reaching out to people with necessary cyber skills in the 
IT sector or academic community to fill gaps in state personnel.”142 As more PLA personnel 
receive education, especially with a focus on science and technology, China will be able to 
construct more lethal and efficient cyberwarfare units.  
Additionally, Ge Juchang, a space-based warfare expert at the Chinese National Defense 
University, indicated that “[China] will construct whatever the enemy fears, with an emphasis on 
developing offensive warfare means. We will construct primarily offensive and asymmetrical 
space based warfare capability systems.”143 As more PLA personnel receive advanced degrees in 
the hard sciences, China’s space-based capabilities will likely continue to improve. Even if most 
officers with advanced degrees in the hard sciences remain in academia and do not gain direct 
operational unit or theater commands, they can still enhance the PLA’s capabilities, using their 
expertise to spur research and development. Further, their articles and publications can influence 
other PLA officers in command positions to place greater emphasis on asymmetric space and 
cyber capabilities.  
However, growing professionalism and education in the PLA also provides unique 
opportunities for the United States. The PLA’s strategic culture is likely to shift in the future as 
more PLA officers receive undergraduate and advanced degrees. Whereas Clausewitz and other 
Western military strategists valued transparency in the use of force, Chinese strategic culture has 
historically focused on a Confucian aversion to violence and emphasized psychological 
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warfare.144 Additionally, a Taoist concept called Shih (势), which emphasizes deception, has 
largely influenced Chinese military strategy.145 Chinese strategic culture is slowly changing due 
to PLA modernization after the first Gulf War and a new group of officers is thinking 
differently.146 As younger, more educated PLA officers receive promotions and the less educated 
old guard is slowly replaced, the PLA may slowly begin to become more transparent and adopt 
new operational cultures. 
Currently, there is a lack of transparency and reciprocity in U.S.-China military 
engagement. For example, on a PLA delegation visit to Pearl Harbor, a former USPACOM 
commander allowed his Chinese counterparts to tour a U.S. nuclear submarine and freely talk to 
enlisted personnel.147 However, his visits to China only involved “limited visibility of 
capabilities, scripted exercise observations, and partial facility visits.”148 Increasing PLA 
education may provide unique opportunities for the U.S. to improve military relations and 
explain to the PLA how transparency can promote stability by helping both sides clarify 
intentions. Additionally, the U.S. will have more opportunities to promote educational exchange 
programs with Chinese officers and, where possible, strengthen personal relationships between 
officers on both sides. 
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Transfer Experience and the Fenfa Youwei Strategy 
 Second, approximately 90% of promoted MR deputy leader-grade officers under Xi had 
experience serving in two or more PLA danwei, including the PLA’s seven MRs, four General 
Departments, and different PLA services and branches at or above the corps leader grade. Based 
on my logit regression analysis, high-level officers with transfer experience are over three times 
more likely to receive promotions than officers without transfer experience. The CMC likely 
considers it vital for promoted officers to gain diverse experience in multiple MRs, services, and 
branches. Wang Shuai-Han also emphasizes that extensive transfer experience can help high-
level officers strengthen their personal networks and gain access to more professional 
contacts.149 
 This information can allow U.S. government analysts to keep track of high-level officers 
with extensive transfer experience, as these officers are significantly more likely to receive grade 
promotions. Additionally, it is important to note that serving in multiple MRs and work units 
provides high-level officers with versatile skillsets, including extensive counterterrorism 
experience in Xinjiang/Tibet and exposure to Hong Kong and Taiwan issues in Guangzhou and 
Nanjing. The United States needs to be prepared for a new generation of PLA officers with 
highly adaptable skillsets and diverse military experience.  
Xi Jinping’s Degree of Personal Control over the PLA 
 Third, scholars and policymakers have extensively debated Xi’s degree of personal 
authority to control the PLA as the Chairman of the CMC. Analyst Nan Li explains that “the 
Commander in Chief has authority over PLA promotions, particularly if [he] is successful in 
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consolidating his leading position in the party and government and within the PLA.”150 
Additionally, Willy Lam describes that Xi has already promoted (in terms of grade) several high-
level officers who have served in the Nanjing MR.151 My theory is that, assuming Xi has 
personal authority to decide which high-level officers should be promoted, he should be more 
inclined to choose officers who have favorable geographic connections from the Nanjing MR 
where Xi once served himself. Xi should also be less likely to promote officers from the 
Lanzhou or Shenyang MRs, which are closely affiliated with his political opponents. 
 However, the results of my study demonstrate that the reverse is true. Officers who have 
served in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to receive promotions, while officers 
who have served the Nanjing MR are less likely to be promoted. As explained above, if we 
proceed under Nan Li’s theory that Xi Jinping prefers to promote officers from the Nanjing MR, 
one of two possibilities is true, both of which have significant impacts for policymakers and U.S. 
government analysts. Either Xi does not have enough influence in the PLA to reduce the amount 
of high-level promotions from the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs, or Xi does not want to promote 
Nanjing MR officers, fearing appearances of nepotism.  
To the extent possible, scholars and government analysts should commission additional 
studies to determine which of these possibilities is more likely. Should the first possibility be 
true, the United States should be aware that discussing critical strategic issues with high-level 
Chinese civilian leaders may be less effective in influencing the PLA’s overall strategic 
objectives than holding regular discussions between high-level U.S. and Chinese active duty 
military officers. Regardless, it is clear that, at least so far, high-level officers serving in the 
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Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to receive promotions, and U.S. analysts should 
track high-level officers currently serving in these regions to predict future promotions. 
  





 China’s recent fenfa youwei foreign policy strategy, proposed by President Xi Jinping, 
actively challenges U.S. regional primacy and demonstrates China’s desires to actively pursue its 
economic and strategic goals. While China’s new economic initiatives, including the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Silk Road, promote trade and investment policies 
favorable to China, the military components of fenfa youwei are much more concerning for the 
United States. The PLA is strengthening its ballistic missile systems, increasingly investing in 
asymmetric cyberwarfare and space-based offensive capabilities, and building more artificial 
islands in the South China Sea. This study allows U.S. policymakers to better understand how 
the PLA is directing its hard power resources to support the fenfa youwei strategy, track the types 
of officers that are likely to fill PLA leadership positions in the future, and prepare policy 
responses to shifting PLA strategic priorities. 
  This thesis finds that younger officers, officers with college and advanced degrees, 
officers with experience serving in multiple PLA work units, and officers who have had 
experience serving in the Lanzhou and Shenyang MRs are more likely to receive promotions. 
Additionally, the PLA has become much more professional, in terms of the proportion of officers 
with advanced degrees and transfer experience, under Xi. This information not only allows 
analysts to predict which types of officers are likely to fill future PLA leadership positions, but 
also suggests that the PLA may increasingly value transparency in the future. Additionally, this 
study demonstrates that geographic elements of personal connections are no longer as important 
for high-level Xi-era promotions. 
 This study contains several shortcomings. First, I did not have sufficient time and 
resources to evaluate informal personal connections between individual PLA officers. I opted 




instead to operationalize personal connections using geographic relationships. Obtaining this 
information through formal interviews or through further extensive research may improve the 
accuracy of these results.  
Second, it was sometimes difficult to collect information about lower-grade PLA officers. 
As much of this information was not publically available, I had to cross reference U.S. 
government documents and online sources from China, Taiwan, and Singapore, which may have 
resulted in minor coding errors. Conducting personal interviews with officers to collect 
information, where possible, may improve information accuracy. 
Third, information for many high-level PLA Navy officers was not available in the CCP 
Elite Database or the Database’s search function did not take them into account. To gather 
information for all PLA officers in the Database who could possibly be serving under Xi Jinping, 
I searched for officers who were born in 1950, or officers at the age of 65 or younger. I then 
collected relevant data from these search results. However, the search results drew heavily from 
officers in the PLA Army and Four General Headquarters Departments. Information for some 
PLA Navy officers was either coded incorrectly in the database, or not available. Experts have 
documented that experience commanding a PLA Navy Escort Task Force (ETF) may increase 
promotion chances, but I was unable to quantitatively confirm these findings in my thesis due to 
the lack of available information. This primarily impacts the non-combat operations and 
international experience sections of my thesis. A future quantitative study focusing only on the 
PLA Navy can fill these gaps.  
Finally, Xi has only been in power for three years, and the CMC has not had the 
opportunity to promote many high-level PLA officers. Replicating this study in several years 
may produce statistically significant results for additional independent variables as the number of 




officers in this dataset increases. However, given the PLA’s recent organizational reforms to the 
MR system, any future study will have to employ different methodologies. 
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Appendix I: List of High-Level PLA Officers under Xi Jinping 
In the spreadsheet below, each officer’s grade is listed above his or her billet. 
The full spreadsheet can be accessed at http://bit.ly/1Rjg6wO. 
  




Name MilRank Grade and Billet before 11/12 Grade and Billet after 11/12 Grade and Billet as of 8/15 GrdChange 
Liu Yazhou (劉亞洲) 上將 (G) 
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Political Commissar, Chinese 
National Defense University 




CCP Central Committee 













President, PLA Academy of 
Military Sciences 
 




CCP Central Committee 













Political Commissar, PLA Navy 
 




National People’s Congress 
 













Political Commissar, PLA 































































Sun Sijin (孫思敬) 上將 (G) 
 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA 
Academy of Military Sciences 
 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA 














Central Military Commission 
CMC Member 
 
Central Military Commission 
CMC Member 
 
Central Military Commission 
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Central Military Commission 
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Zhang Yang (張陽) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 









Central Military Commission 
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Commander, Guangzhou MR  
MR Leader 
 




Commander, Guangzhou MR 
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Qi Jianguo (戚建國) 上將 (G) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Assistant to the Chief of Staff 
 
MR Leader  
 
PLA Deputy Chief of Staff 
 
MR Leader  
 




























Li Shiming (李世明) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 










Du Hengyan (杜恆岩) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 













Wang Xibin (王喜斌) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 





President, Chinese National 
Defense University 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 
 




 Wang Jianping (王建平) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 
















Wang Jiaocheng (王教成) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader  
 
Commander, Shenyang MR 
 
MR Leader  
 
Commander, Shenyang MR 
 
MR Leader  
 
Commander, Shenyang MR 
0 
 
Wang Hongyao (王洪堯) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 















 Tian Xiusi (田修思) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Chengdu 
MR 
 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLAAF 
 
MR Leader  
 













PLA Deputy Chief of Staff 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 








Cai Yingting (蔡英挺) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 












Chu Yimin (褚益民) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 















Xu Qiliang (許其亮) 上將 (G) 
CMC Member 
 




Central Military Commission 
 
CMC Vice Chairman 
 




Xu Yaoyuan (許耀元) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 










Political Commissar, PLA 
Academy of Military Sciences 
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Jia Tingan (賈廷安) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA General 
Political Department 
 
MR Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA General 
Political Department 
 
MR Leader  
 





Ma Xiaotian (馬曉天) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 












Wei Liang (魏亮) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 







































Du Hengyan (杜恒岩) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 













Liu Yuejun (劉粵軍) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Lanzhou MR 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 




Song Puxuan (宋普選) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 








Zhang Shibo (張仕波) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 














Li Zuocheng (李作成) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Chengdu 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Chengdu MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Yin Fanglong (殷方龍) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 















Wang Guanzhong (王冠中) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 













Wang Ning (王寧) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 












Miao Hua (苗華) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Lanzhou Military Region 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 









Zhao Zongqi (趙宗岐) 上將 (G) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 












Zheng Weiping (鄭衛平) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 















Du Jincai (杜金才) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 










Deputy Director, PLA’s 




Fan Changlong (范長龍) 上將 (G) 
MR Leader 
 
Commander, Jinan MR 
 
 
CMC Vice Chairman 
 
 






Ding Yiping (丁一平) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 








Ding Laihang (丁來杭) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 







Ding Haichun (丁海春) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Director, Political Department, 
PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









Ding Jiye (丁繼業) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 











Yi Xiaoguang (乙曉光) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 













Yu Jianwei (于建偉) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Director, Political Department, 
People’s Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Director, Political Department, 
People’s Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
 0 
Ren Haiquan (任海泉) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy 
of Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA 




He Yinghua (何映華) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, People’s 
Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









He Qingcheng (何清成) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 21st Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




He Weirong (何為榮) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 

























Hou Jizhen (侯繼振) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 








Hou HeHua (侯賀華) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 




Diao Guoxin (刁國新) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 13th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 13th Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Liu Zhuoming (劉卓明) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department’s 
Science and Technology 
Committee 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department’s Science 
and Technology Committee 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department’s 





Liu Zhenlai (劉振來) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Beijing 
MR Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Beijing MR 
Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Beijing 




Liu Xiaorong (劉曉榕) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
General Logistics Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 








Liu Liangkai (劉良凱) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Liu Zheng (劉錚) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Command 
Department, General Logistics 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, General Logistics 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Liu Zhangyin (劉長銀) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Liu Lei (劉雷) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 21st Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 










Wu Gang (吳剛) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wu Guohua (吳國華) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wu Zhanghai (吳長海) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wu Yunfeng (吳雲峰) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 






Lu Dingwen (呂丁文) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 










 Lu Jiancheng (呂建成) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, Jinan 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Zhou Laiqiang (周來強) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Zhou Xiaozhou (周小周) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 14th Group Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 14th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Sun Huangtian (孫黃田) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader 
 




MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, General Logistics 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Song Kun (宋琨) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






You Haitao (尤海濤) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader 
 




Commander, 42nd Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Cen Xu (岑旭) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Assistant Director, General 
Political Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Yue Shixin (岳世鑫) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA Hong 
Kong Garrison 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA Hong 
Kong Garrison 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA 








Cui Changjun (崔昌軍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Beijing MR 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Assistant Director, General 
Political Department 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




Cui Jinglong (崔景龍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 





Nian Fuchun (年福純) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy 
of Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA 




Zhang Yuting (張余亭) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Second Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Second Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Zhang Guodong (張國棟) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Zhang Baoshu (張寶書) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 








Zhang Jianping (張建平) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Guangzhou MR 
Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Guangzhou MR Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Zhang Yongyi (張永義) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 












Zhang Lieying (張烈英) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, Jinan 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Zhang Tiejian (張鐵健) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Peng Bo (彭勃) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 40th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Peng Yong (彭勇) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Xinjiang Military 
District 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Xu Dexue (徐德學) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Xu Hongmeng (徐洪猛) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Xu Lili (徐莉莉) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy 
of Military Science 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA 





Fang Dianrong (方殿榮) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Chengdu 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 












Zhu Fazhong (朱發忠) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 
NPC Standing Committee 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 




Zhu Jinlin (朱錦林) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Lanzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 








Li Guohui (李國輝) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Li Shaojun (李少軍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 








Li Xiubao (李秀寶) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Political Commissar, PLA 




Political Commissar, PLA Nanjing 
Political College 
 
Corps Leader  
 






Chai Shaoliang (柴紹良) 中將 (LtG) MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Chengdu MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






MR Deputy Leader 
 







Yang Guohai (楊國海) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, PLA Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 












Yang Xuejun (楊學軍) 中將 (LtG) 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, PLA National 




MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, PLA National University 
of Defense Technology 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, PLA National 







Yang Jianting (楊建亭) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Yang Hui (楊暉) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Chief of Staff, Nanjing MR 
 0 
Yang Dongming (楊東明) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Yang Yuwen (楊玉文) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 20th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 20th Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Yang Jinshan (楊金山) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Tibet Military 
District 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Duan Duanwu (段端武) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 












Jiang Jianzeng (江建曾) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Beijing MR Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Beijing MR Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Pan Changjie (潘昌杰) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, People’s 
Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, People’s 
Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Niu Zhizhong (牛志忠) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, People’s Armed 
Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, People’s Armed 
Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Niu Hongguang (牛紅光) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Leader  
 









Wang Jiurong (王久榮) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Wang Wei (王偉) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 





Wang Jian (王健) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wang Zhaohai (王兆海) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 













Wang Zengbo (王增缽) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, PLA Hong 
Kong Garrison 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, PLA Hong 
Kong Garrison 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, PLA 




Wang Jiasheng (王家勝) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
General Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
General Armament Department 
 
MR Leader  
 





Wang Ping (王平) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 1st Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wang Xiaojun (王曉軍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Commander, PLA Hong Kong 
Garrison 
 







Wang Xiaolong (王曉龍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 




Wang Sentai (王森泰) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA Academy of Military 
Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Navy 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 
 




Wang Yongsheng (王永生) 中將 (LtG) 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Chinese 
National Defense University 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Chinese National 
Defense University 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Wang Zhimin (王治民) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Wang Hongguang (王洪光) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing 
MR 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 















Commander, 20th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 




Wang Yufa (王玉發) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Wang Dengping (王登平) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Wang Huayong (王華勇) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department 
for the PLA Navy’s South China 
Sea Fleet 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department for 
the PLA Navy’s South China Sea 
Fleet 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Wang Xixin (王西欣) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, Chinese 
National Defense University 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 








Wang Zhanghe (王長河) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
0 
 




Tian Zhong (田中) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Jinan MR 
and 
Commander, PLA Navy’s North 
China Sea Fleet 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Jinan MR 
and 
Commander, PLA Navy’s North 
China Sea Fleet 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Tian Yigong (田義功) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









 Zhang Ruiqing (張瑞清) 
 
中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Beijing 
People’s Armed Police Corps 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
People’s Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 








Director, Operations Division, 




Director, Operations Division, 
General Staff Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




Bai Wenqi (白文奇) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, Jinan 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Shi Xiangyuan (石香元) 中將 (LtG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Qin Weijiang (秦衛江) 中將 (LtG) 
 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing 
MR 
MR Deputy Leader  
 














Qin Yinhe (秦銀河) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, General 
Logistics Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









Shu Yutai (舒玉泰) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Tibet Military 
District 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Commander, Tibet Military 
District 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Ai Husheng (艾虎生) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Chengdu 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Chengdu MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Fan Zhangmi (范長秘) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Director, Political Department, 
Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Director, Political Department, 
Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Zhuang Kezhu (莊可柱) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Lanzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Lanzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Jiang Weilie (蔣偉烈) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Commander, PLA Navy’s South 
China Sea Fleet 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Commander, PLA Navy’s South 
China Sea Fleet 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Jiang Moxiang (蔣謨祥) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Su Shiliang (蘇士亮) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Su Zhiqian (蘇支前) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Xu Yong (許勇) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 13th Group Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 13th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Jia Yanming (賈延明) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 







Jia Xiaowei (賈曉煒) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, Guangzhou MR 
 







Zhao Yiliang (趙以良) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Shenyang 
MR Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Shenyang 
MR Air Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Political Commissar, 




Zhao Jianzhong (趙建中) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Lanzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 








Zhao Kaizeng (趙開增) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Chengdu MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 







Deng Tiansheng (鄧天生) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Second Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 











Zheng Qin (鄭勤) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Zheng Qunliang (鄭群良) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Chen Xiaogong (陳小工) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Air 
Force 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 















Chief of Staff, Beijing MR Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Lu Fuen (陸福恩) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Ma Yiming (馬宜明) 中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Commander, 26th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




Gao Shouwei (高守維) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
 
MR Leader  
 









Gao Jianguo (高建國) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Gao DongLu (高東璐) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA 
Beijing Garrison 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA Beijing 
Garrison 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Gao Jin (高津) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Chief of Staff, Second Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Ma Zhenjun (麻振軍) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




Huang Jianguo (黃建國) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Huang Hanbiao (黃漢標) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 








Wang Xiangfu (王祥富) 
 
中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Chengdu MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










He Lei (何雷) 中將 (LtG) 
 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science’s Research 
Department for Operational 
Theory and Doctrine 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science’s Research 
Department for Operational 
Theory and Doctrine 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, PLA 









Liu Zhigang (劉志剛) 中將 (LtG) 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Wang Li (王力) 
 
中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Comprehensive 
Planning Department, General 
Armament Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Comprehensive Planning 
Department, General Armament 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Xu Yuanlin (徐遠林) 
 
中將 (LtG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 54th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 54th Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 










MR Deputy Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Xinjiang 
Military District 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
















Commander, 38th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA 
Navy’s East China Sea Fleet 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy’s 
East China Sea Fleet 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 




Han Weiguo (韓衛國) 中將 (LtG) 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 12th Group Army 
 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 12th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 















Commander, Inner Mongolia 
Provincial MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Commander, PLA’s Beijing 
Garrison 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Zhu Fuxi (朱福熙) 
 
中將 (LtG) 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Chengdu 
MR 
 
MR Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Chengdu MR 
 
MR Leader  
 










MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Chinese 
National Defense University 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 













MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Director, General Armament 











MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Shenyang 
MR 
 







Liu Sheng (劉勝) 少將 (MG) 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, General 
Armament Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Yu Qilong (于起龍) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 





Deputy Political Commissar, 









 He Hongcheng (何宏成) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Director, People’s Armed 





Director, People’s Armed Police’s 
Forest Command Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Chief of Staff, 





He Weidong (何衛東) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 










Commander, PLA’s Shanghai 
Garrison 
 0 
Fu Chuanyu (傅傳玉) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Gansu 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Gansu 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Gansu 
Provincial MR 
 0 
Leng Degui (冷德貴) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Director, Department of 
Management and Support, 




Director, Department of 









Liu Chixing (劉季幸) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 





Deputy Director, PLA’s Military 
Court 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Liu Xiaowu (劉小午) 少將 (MG) 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 41st Group Army 
 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 41st Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Liu Congliang (劉從良) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Shandong 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 













Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 40th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 40th Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Liu Zhenli (劉振立) 
 
少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 65th Group Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 38th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Liu Shenyang (劉沈揚) 
 
少將 (MG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Jinan MR 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Jinan MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 










Corps Leader  
 
Director, Discipline Inspection 
Department, General Political 
Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Discipline Inspection 
Department, General Political 
Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Political 





Liu Shengjie (劉生傑) 少將 (MG) 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
General Logistics Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
General Logistics Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 


































Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Hainan 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 




















Commander, Hebei Provincial MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 









Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Political 
Department, Guangzhou MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Political 
Department, Guangzhou MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 






Lu Minsong (呂民松) 
 
少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Political 
Department, Jinan MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Political 
Department, Jinan MR 
 













Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 52nd Base, Second 
Artillery 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 52nd Base, Second 
Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Zhou Aimin (周愛民) 少將 (MG) 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Chief of Staff, People’s 
Armed Police 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Chief of Staff, People’s 
Armed Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Deputy Director, Chinese 


















Deputy Chief of Staff, Guangzhou 
MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 














Corps Leader  
 




















MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy 
of Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, PLA 









Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Logistics 
Department, People’s Armed 
Police 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Logistics 
Department, People’s Armed 
Police 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 









Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 31st Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 31st Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
















Assistant Chief of Staff, PLA Air 
Force 
 
Corps Leader  
 





Kang Chunyuan (康春元) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Deputy Director, Political 




Deputy Director, Political 
Department, Beijing MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 













Political Commissar, PLA’s 





Political Commissar, PLA’s 
Second Artillery Command 
College 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 
















Political Commissar, Shanxi 




Political Commissar, Shanxi 












Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Hebei 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Hebei 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 










Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 39th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 39th Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Liaoning 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 












Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA 
Navy’s East China Sea Fleet 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, PLA Navy’s 













Secretary, General Office, 
General Political Department 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 






















Director, Armament Department, 
Second Artillery 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
















Director, Strategic Planning 





Director, Strategic Planning 
Department, General Staff 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 



































Commander, 54th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
























Chang Yeting (昌業廷) 少將 (MG) 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Ningxia Provincial 
MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Ningxia Provincial 
MR 
 












Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Director, CMC General 
Office 
 
Corps Leader  
 

















Director, Logistics Department, 




Director, Logistics Department, 
















Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Fujian 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Fujian 
Provincial MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 










Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Guizhou Provincial 
MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Guizhou Provincial 
MR 
 












Corps Leader  
 
Director, Propaganda 
Department, General Political 
Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Propaganda Department, 
General Political Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 












Director, Xichang Satellite 





Director, Xichang Satellite Launch 
Center, General Armament 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 












Political Commissar, Nanjing 




Political Commissar, Nanjing 













Corps Leader  
 
Director, PLA’s Military 
Procuratorate 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, PLA’s Military 
Procuratorate 
 


































Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Xinjiang 
Military District 
 
Corps Leader  
 

















Department, Audit Office, PLA 




Department, Audit Office, PLA 




Department, Audit Office, 
































Commander, PLA Air Force’s 




Commander, PLA Air Force’s 15th 
Airborne Corps 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 













Commander, Hubei Province 




Commander, Hubei Province 
People’s Armed Police Corps 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 











Corps Leader  
 





Political Commissar, 12th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 




















Director, PLA’s Naval Command 
College 
 
















Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 39th Group Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, 39th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






























Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Ningxia 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Ningxia 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 









Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, 16th Group 
Army 
 
Corps Leader  
 





Deputy Director, Political 

























Bai Nianfa (白念法) 
 
少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Guanxi 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Guanxi 
Provincial MR 
 
Retired from the PLA 
 
Guangxi Provincial 




































Political Commissar, Guizhou 
Provincial MR 
MR Deputy Leader  
 














Director, Department of 





Director, Department of 
Organization, General Political 
Department 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 









Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 
General Staff Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Political Department, 














Director, Strategic Teaching and 
Research Department, Chinese 




Director, Strategic Teaching and 
Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Director, Chinese 











Deputy Director, PLA National 





Deputy Director, PLA National 




Deputy Director, PLA 

















Commander, 22nd Base, Second 
Artillery 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Armament 










Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Sichuan 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 

































Corps Leader  
 
Director, PLA Nanjing Institute 
of Politics 
 
Corps Leader  
 









































General Political Department 
(unspecified) 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 

















Deputy Commander, Xinjiang 
Military District 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Deputy Commander, Xinjiang 




















Political Commissar, 52nd 









MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
  
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Commander, Guangzhou 
MR 
 















Deputy Political Commissar, 




Deputy Political Commissar, 
PLA’s Beijing Garrison 
 
Corps Leader  
 










Deng Ruihua (鄧瑞華) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Joint 





Political Commissar, Joint 









Chen Yong (陳勇) 少將 (MG) 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
PLA Assistant Chief of Staff 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
PLA Assistant Chief of Staff 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 





Chen Pinghua (陳平華) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 





Political Commissar, 41st Group 
Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 






Chen Honghai (陳紅海) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 















Tao Zhengming (陶正明) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, Jiangxi 
Provincial MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 









Lu Xiao (陸曉) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA 
Navy’s Experimentation and 
Training Base 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Political Commissar, PLA Navy’s 





Political Commissar, Aerial 










MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 
Deputy Political Commissar, 
Shenyang MR 
 
MR Deputy Leader 
 










Feng Shiping (馮世平) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Political Commissar, Armament 




Political Commissar, Armament 








Feng Danyu (馮丹宇) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Director, Armed Services 





Director, Armed Services 
Armament Department, General 
Armament Department 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Director, Comprehensive 






Gao Guanghui (高光輝) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 




Commander, 16th Group Army 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Wei Youjiang (魏佑江) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 
Commander, Shanghai People’s 




Commander, Shanghai People’s 




Deputy Chief of Staff, 




Huang Guoxian (黃國顯) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 





Chief of Staff, Nanjing MR Air 
Force 
 
MR Deputy Leader  
 





Huang Yuejin (黃躍進) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Hunan Provincial 
MR 
 
Corps Leader  
 
Commander, Hunan Provincial 
MR 
 












Commander, Xinjiang People’s 




Commander, Xinjiang People’s 




Deputy Chief of Staff, 





Qi Zhangming (齊長明) 少將 (MG) 
Corps Leader 
 

















1. Removed from Party committee due to incompetence. 
2. Expelled from Communist Party for "serious disciplinary violations." Apparently had ties to Bo Xilai. 
3. In February of 2016, Qin Weijiang was selected as the political commissar for the PLA’s new Eastern Theater Command. The CCP Elite Database may 
have speculated about Qin’s promotion in mid-2015. Still, Qin was ultimately selected for a promotion, so I assigned him a GrdChange score of one. 
4. The English translation of this Tibetan name is by the Author. See: http://highpeakspureearth.com/2012/tibetan-names-in-simplified-chinese-1/.  
5. Retired likely due to an ongoing corruption investigation. 
6. Retired likely due to an ongoing corruption investigation. 




Appendix II: List of PLA Billets at Each Grade 
  






Chart of Billets at or above the Corps Leader Grade in the PLA's Four General Headquarters 
Departments 
 
Source: Professor Kou Chien-Wen, National Chengchi University 
  











This translation is by the author. 
Chart of Billets at or above the Corps Leader Grade in the PLA's Four General Headquarters Departments 
Grade 
General Staff Department 
(GSD) 
General Political Department 
(GPD) 
General Logistics Department 
(GLD) 
General Armaments Department 
(GAD) 
CMC Member 
Chief of Staff 
Director, General Political 
Department 
Director, General Logistics 
Department 
Director, General Armaments 
Department 
Deputy Executive Chief of Staff 
Deputy Executive Director, General 
Political Department 
    
MR Leader 
Deputy Chief of Staff 
Deputy Director, General Political 
Department 
Political Commissar, General 
Logistics Department 
Political Commissar, General 
Armaments Department 
      
Director, Science and Technology 




Assistant Chief of Staff 
Assistant Director, General 
Political Department 
Deputy Director, General Logistics 
Department 
Deputy Director, General Armaments 
Department 
    
Deputy Political Commissar, 
General Logistics Department 
Deputy Political Commissar, General 
Armaments Department 
      
Deputy Director, Science and 
Technology Commission, General 
Armaments Department 
Corps Leader 
Director, GSD General Office 
General Secretary, GPD General 
Office 
Chief of Staff, GLD's Command 
Department 
Chief of Staff, GAD's Command 
Department 
Director, GSD Operations 
Department 
Director, GPD's Cadre Department 
Director, GLD's Political 
Department 
Director, GAD's Political Department 
Director/PC, GSD Intelligence 
Department 
Director, GPD's Organization 
Department 
Director, GLD's Finance 
Department 
Director/PC, GAD's Logistics 
Department 




Director/PC, GSD Technical 
Reconnaissance Department  
Director, GPD's Propaganda 
Department 
Director, GLD's Department of 
Military Supplies, Materials, and 
Oil 
Director, GAD's Comprehensive 
Planning Department 
Director/PC, GSD Electronics 
Department 
Director, GPD's Liaison 
Department 
Director, GLD's Department of 
Health 




Director, GPD's Security 
Department 
Director, GLD's Department of 
Military Traffic and Transportation 
Director, GAD's Department of 
Research and Ordering Army 
Equipment 
Director, PLA's Strategic 
Planning Department within the 
GSD 
Director, GPD's Discipline 
Inspection Department 
Auditor-General, GLD's Audit 
Office 
Director, GAD's Department of 
General-Purpose Equipment Support 
Director/PC, GSD Military 
Training Department 
Director/PC, GPD's Department for 
Direct-Authority Work 
Director/PC, GLD's Logistics 
College 
Director, GAD's Department of 
Electronic Information Infrastructure 
Director, GSD Department of 
Military Affairs 
Director, PLA's Military 
Procuratorate 
Director/PC, GLD's Institute for 
Military Medicine and Science 
Director/PC, GAD's Equipment 
Institute 
Director, GSD Mobilization 
Department 
Director, PLA's Military 
Prosecutor's Office 
Director/PC, PLA's General 
Military Hospital (301 Military 
Hospital) 
Director, GAD's International 
Cooperation Department 
Director/PC, GSD Management 
and Support Department 
Editor in Chief/Director, PLA Daily 
Newspaper 
Commander/PC, GLD's Wuhan 
Rear Base 
Director, GAD's 921 Construction 
Office (In charge of Chinese manned 
space flight). 
Director, GSD Political 
Department 
Director/PC, PLA's Nanjing 
Political College 
  
Commander/PC, GAD's 20th 
Experimentation and Training Base 
(Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center) 
Director/PC, GSD Army and 
Air Force Department 
    
Commander/PC, GAD's 21st 
Experimentation and Training Base 
(Malan Nuclear Experimentation Base) 
Director, GSD's Office of 
External Affairs 
    
Commander/PC, GAD's 25th 
Experimentation and Training Base 
(Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center) 




Director, GSD's Guard Bureau     
Commander/PC, GAD's 26th 
Experimentation and Training Base 
(Xi'an Satellite Monitoring and Control 
Center) 
Director/PC, PLA Military 
Institute of Technology 
    
Commander/PC, GAD's 29th 
Experimentation and Training Base 
(China Aerodynamics Research and 
Development Center) 
Director/PC, PLA's Information 
and Engineering University 
      
Director/PC, PLA's Nanjing 
Army Command College 
      
Director/PC, PLA's 
Shijiazhuang Army Command 
College 
      
  






Chart of Billets at or above the Corps Leader Grade in the Military Region Grade Level Danwei, 
People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police 
 
Source: Professor Kou Chien-Wen, National Chengchi University 
 
 



















This translation is by the author. 
 
Chart of Billets at or above the Corps Leader Grade in the Work Units, PLA and PAP 
Grade Seven Military Regions Military Branches and the PAP Military Institutes and Academies 
CMC Member 
  Commander, PLA Navy   
  Commander, PLA Air Force   
  Commander, Second Artillery   
MR Leader 
Commander Political Commissar, PLA Navy 
Director/PC, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
Political Commissar 
Political Commissar, PLA Air 
Force 
Director/PC, Chinese National 
Defense University 
  









Deputy Commander Deputy Commander, PLA Navy 
Deputy Director, PLA Academy of 
Military Science 
Deputy Political Commissar 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Navy 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Academy of Military Science 
Chief of Staff Chief of Staff, PLA Navy 
Deputy Director, Chinese National 
Defense University 
Director, Political Department 
Director, PLA Navy's Political 
Department 
Deputy Political Commissar, 




Director/PC, PLA Navy's North 
Sea Fleet 
Director/PC, PLA National 
University of Defense Technology 
Commander/PC, PLA's Hong 
Kong Garrison 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's East Sea 
Fleet 
  
Commander/PC, PLA's Beijing 
Garrison 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's South 
Sea Fleet 
  
Commander/PC, Tibet Military 
District 




Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
Air Force 
  
  Chief of Staff, PLA Air Force   
  
Director, PLAAF's Political 
Department 
  





Commander/PC of any, Seven 
Military Region Air Forces 
  
  




Deputy Political Commissar, 
Second Artillery 
  
  Chief of Staff, Second Artillery   
  








Deputy Political Commissar, 
People's Armed Police 
  
  








Deputy Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy 
Director, Political Department, PLA 
Academy of Military Science 
Deputy Director, Political 
Department 
Deputy Director, PLA Navy's 
Political Department 
Director, Scientific Research 
Guidance Department, PLA 
Academy of Military Science 
Director/PC, Joint Logistics 
Department 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's Logistics 
Department 
Director, Military Theory and 
Strategic Research Department, 
PLA Academy of Military Science 
Director, Armaments 
Department 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's 
Armaments Department 
Director, Operational Theory and 
Doctrine Research Department, 
PLA Academy of Military Science 
Commander/PC for any of the 
Group Armies 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's 
Command College 
Director, Military Construction 
Research Department, PLA 
Academy of Military Science 
Commander/PC for any of the 
Provincial Military Regions 
Director/PC, PLA Navy's 
Engineering University 
Director, World Military Affairs 
Research Department, PLA 
Academy of Military Science 
Commander/PC for the PLA 
Garrison of any Directly-
Controlled Municipalities 
besides Beijing 
Commander/PC, PLA Navy's 
Experimentation and Training Base 
Education Superintendent, Chinese 
National Defense University 





PC, Xinjiang Military District 
Deputy Director/Deputy PC of each 
of the PLA Navy's Fleets 
Director, Chinese National Defense 
University's Political Department 
Chief of Staff, Xinjiang 
Military District 
Chief of Staff of each of the PLA 
Navy's Fleets 
Director, Scientific Research 
Guidance Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
Director, Political Department, 
Xinjiang Military District 
Director, Political Department of 
each of the PLA Navy's Fleets 
Director, Strategic Teaching and 
Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
Commander/PC, Nanjiang 
Military District 
Commander/PC, Aerial Troops for 
each of the PLA Navy's Fleets 
Director, Battle Teaching and 
Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
  
Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Air 
Force 
Director, Marxism Teaching and 
Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
  
Deputy Director, PLA Air Force's 
Political Department 
Director, Information Operations 
and Command Training Teaching 
and Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
  
Director/PC, PLA Air Force's 
Logistics Department 
Director, Military Construction and 
Militray Political Work Teaching 
and Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
  
Director/PC, PLA Air Force's 
Armaments Department 
Director, Military Logistics and 
Military Technical Armaments 
Teaching and Research Department, 
Chinese National Defense 
University 
  
Director/PC, PLA Air Force's 
Command College 
Director, National Defense 
Research Department, Chinese 
National Defense University 
  
Director/PC, PLA Air Force's 
Engineering University 
Deputy Director, PLA National 
University of Defense Technology 
  
Commander/PC, PLA Air Force's 
15th Airbourne Corps 
Deputy Political Commissar, PLA 
National University of Defense 
Technology 





Deputy Commander/Deputy PC of 
each of the Military Region Air 
Forces 
Education Superintendent, PLA 
National University of Defense 
Technology 
  
Chief of Staff of each of the 
Military Region Air Forces 
Director, Political Department, PLA 
National University of Defense 
Technology 
  
Director, Political Department of 
each, Military Region Air Forces 
  
  




























































Director/PC, PAP's Gold Mine 
Command Department 
  

























Director/PC, Ministry of Public 
Security's Border Control Bureau 
  
  
Director/PC, Ministry of Public 
Security's Fire Department 
  
  
Director/PC, Minsitry of Public 
Security's Guard Bureau 
  
  
Director/PC, People's Armed Police 
Force Academy 
  
 
 
